

SOCIETY FOR TERRORISM RESEARCH

9TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

CONTENTIOUS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

DAY 1:		
Presenter	Title	Abstract
KEYNOTE (10:30 – 11:15)		
Tore Bjørgo	Counterterrorism as Crime Prevention	Within democratic societies, counter-terrorism is almost exclusively about crime prevention. A broad and holistic approach to preventing terrorism can be based on nine preventive mechanisms: Building normative barriers against terrorism, reducing radicalization and recruitment, deterrence, disruption, incapacitation, protecting vulnerable targets, reducing benefits to terrorists, reducing harm, and facilitating disengagement from terrorism. Counter-terrorist policies which are only based on a narrow range of repressive mechanisms and military measures tend to become overly heavy-handed, producing serious negative side-effects which serve to enhance the problem rather than reducing it. A more holistic approach, making use of the entire range of preventive mechanisms, may lighten the impact of the “hard” measures by relying more on the impact of the “softer” and more positive measures to build moral barriers, reduce recruitment, and facilitate exit from terrorist movements.
PANEL SESSION: METHODOLOGICAL INSIGHTS (11:20 – 12:50)		
Paul Gill & Emily Corner	Clustered Pre-Attack Behaviors of Lone Actor Terrorists and Mass Casualty Offenders: Implications for Threat Assessment	This paper utilizes a grounded-theory quantitative approach to categorize behavioral patterns across a sample of lone actor terrorists and mass casualty offenders. The aim here is to uncover distinctive clusters of variables without prior assumptions. This analysis focuses upon variable co-occurrence without distinguishing a dependent variable at the outset. Prominent examples include Canter and Heritage’s (1990) work on serial rapists, and Canter et al.’s (2004) work on serial murder. Although the distinctions outlined elsewhere in previous research should illustrate some key differences between subgroups of offenders, they also highlight the limitations of comparing offenders based on these types of distinctions. Although significant differences can be highlighted on a number of variables, rarely is it the case that a behavior is only present in one subgroup. In other words, there is a lot of overlap across subgroups

		<p>and often they have much in common. When classifications are dichotomous (e.g., present/absent), the assumption of commonality is even more clear-cut. Such concerns therefore may warrant the use of multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) techniques. Such techniques provide geometric representations of the level of association between variables. In other words, MDS outputs represent a matrix wherein variables that regularly co-occur are plotted closer together in a Euclidean space. The utility of such a representation is that the variable configuration is based upon variables' relationships with each other rather than their relationships with pre-determined dimensions. Distinctive clusters of co-occurring behaviors will be identified and this will help advance a typology of lone violent offenders.</p>
Sarah Knight	<p>Conducting Empirical Research to Understand Violent Extremism: A Discussion of Design and Methodological Issues</p>	<p>Terrorist attacks across the world demonstrate how human beings can commit catastrophic acts of violence for a variety of reasons. However, the subjective nature and lack of consensus regarding the definitions of key concepts such as 'terrorism', 'extremism' and 'radicalisation' create a problem for those seeking to study and understand why individuals become involved in and conduct acts of terrorism. There are other criticisms regarding the large body of literature in this area. First, few studies have applied rigorous analysis to real-life datasets. Second, terrorism is largely portrayed as a group phenomenon, and as such cannot account for 'lone wolf' attacks. Third, whilst many individuals support the use of violence to achieve non-mainstream political aims (i.e. 'extremists'); very few of these actively facilitate or actually commit acts of extreme violence. And fourth, the limited empirical research in this area rarely includes a control or comparison group, which means that findings can be difficult to interpret. The present project applied an empirical approach to compare extremists who have committed acts of violence compared to those who have not. Within these categories, extremists operating alone were compared to those operating as part of a group. This presentation will provide an overview of the research design and the rationale for this. Problems encountered regarding the categorisation of individuals as violent or non-violent, and as lone actors or group members, are discussed, as well as other issues that occurred as a result of conducting this real-world, in-the-field research.</p>
William L. Tafoya	<p>New Approach to Assessing Terrorist Incidents: Cross Impact Matrix Analysis</p>	<p>It is proposed that the Cross-Impact Matrix Analysis (CIMA) methodology offers a promising new approach to assessing important aspects of terrorist violence. With the rise of terrorism in the mid-1960 such events</p>

		<p>began being studied and consistently reported upon in a wide variety of publications including scholarly and media accounts. Of course the topic has also been addressed in numerous classified documents of most nations worldwide. The 9/11 terrorists attacks on the United States 14 years ago invigorated renewed interest in terrorism research. Ironically, in the same half-century since it was developed in 1966, terrorism-focused scholars have largely overlooked CIMA as an analytical tool. Despite the plethora of topical material in the academic literature today the same sources are devoid of mention of the use of this valuable analytical tool. Using the search terms: “Cross-Impact Matrix Analysis and Terrorism” for the period 1966 to 2015, <i>Dissertation Abstracts International</i> (DAI), for example, reflects not a single Ph.D. dissertation wherein CIMA was made use of. On the other hand, United Nations Millennium Project researchers have drawn upon CIMA to evaluate terrorist aggression. This paper will present a review the relevant literature as well as report on research recently undertaken with graduate students wherein factors germane to a better understanding of the terrorism phenomenon, it is asserted, may be identified using CIMA.</p>
<p>PANEL SESSION: THE MANY FACES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM (11:20 – 12:50)</p>		
<p>Philip Davies</p>	<p>Threat du Jour: Insurgency, Terrorism and Intelligence Doctrine</p>	<p>Between 2001 and 2014 the UK's armed forces and intelligence community found themselves engaged in two long-running and interconnected campaigns, one against insurgency in Afghanistan and the other more globally and domestically against terrorism, both underpinned by common ideological extremism. By 2009 the conduct of combat operations and operational intelligence support had undergone such radical institutional and technological transformations that a 'radical re-write' of military intelligence professional practice or 'doctrine' was mandated by Defence Intelligence leadership. This paper will draw on work done by the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies for the MoD Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and wider UK defence and national security thinking during this period. It will examine how the challenge of extremist mobilisation, emerging awareness of hybrid adversaries and the increased currency of the notion of 'wicked problems' alternately propelled and constrained efforts to articulate an intelligence doctrine suitable to the current strategic environment. It will conclude that there exist limits to the degree to which intelligence practice can become 'better at' coping with the triune challenge of insurgency, terrorism and extremism and that the underlying issue is actually one of</p>

		'understanding' by both analysts and operational commanders -- to such a degree that a separate doctrine on 'understanding' had been articulated as part of the 2009 rewrite.
David McIlhatton, Duncan Moss, Rachel Monaghan & David BaMaung	The Role of Geospatial Data, Technology and Information in Protecting People and Place	The challenges that manifest themselves in protecting people and place from terrorist attack are well documented. They are furthered by the multidisciplinary and multiagency approach needed to prepare for, manage and mitigate such events as well as the complexities of delivering a holistic security model. The research presented in this paper seeks to demonstrate how such a model can be developed and operationalised to deliver on the philosophy of keeping people safe. Whilst many challenges exist in relation to delivering a holistic security model, the primary focus of this paper is on the role of geospatial data, technology and information and how partnership working between academia, law enforcement and government can deliver real benefits in relation to enhancing the decision making process for protecting people and place. The impact of such partnership working can be realised through making areas more competitive and ensuring that they are attractive for people to live, work, social, visit and invest.
Bart Schuurman	Re-integrating (Violent) Extremists: Evaluating a Dutch Initiative 2013-2014	<p>Recent years have seen a marked increase of interest among policy makers and academics in the possibilities for re-integrating into society prisoners with a background of involvement in extremism or terrorism. Numerous countries have developed special programs for this specific purpose. Crucially, however, it is still unclear if and how reintegration programs can bring about disengagement or deradicalization. This is due in part to an imperfect understanding of these processes. Furthermore, some exceptions notwithstanding, reliable data on recidivism rates among extremist prisoners is frequently scarce and anecdotal. More importantly, a general absence of evaluatory studies designed to critically and objectively assess the efficacy of these re-integration programs means that it is at present difficult to reliably identify best practices and promising ways forward.</p> <p>In mid-2012, the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and the Dutch Probation Service (RN) initiated a re-integration program focused on offenders with a background of involvement in extremism or terrorism. The ongoing program has three goals. The first is to reduce recidivism among extremist and terrorist offenders through specialized re-socialization and aftercare. Its second goal is to expand the Dutch government's ability to monitor such offenders after their release</p>

		<p>from prison through the imposition of mandatory probation. Thirdly, the program was envisioned as a prevention-focused addition to the Dutch government’s counterterrorism toolkit.</p> <p>The author was contracted by the NCTV to succinctly evaluate the practical implementation of the program and to provide a preliminary indication of its effectiveness during the February 2013 to February 2014 period. To do so, three rounds of semi-structured interviews with personnel involved in the program were held between February 2013 and February 2014. Results suggest that the program is largely based on sound ‘operational logic’; i.e. the assumptions concerning the involved organizations’ ability to implement the necessary measures. Its emphasis on effectuating disengagement rather than ideological deradicalization also suggests the program’s ‘cognitive logic’ reflects realistic expectations regarding best-case outcomes. Nevertheless, the program’s first year saw mixed results with regard to the reintegration of extremist offenders. These outcomes are discussed and specific attention is given to the organizational implementation of the program, which can serve as lessons learned.</p>
<p>Méabh Ní Maolalaidh & Kiran Sarma</p>	<p>Counter-radicalisation Approaches to Preventing Vulnerable Youths from Engaging in Violent Extremism</p>	<p>Objective: Many European counter-radicalisation initiatives (CRI) emerged as a result of the rise in terrorism in 2006. In 2011, the European Commission set up the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) to bring together Frontline Workers (FLW’s) from different countries and different disciplines (i.e. health, social, local authority, police, teachers, prison officers etc.). This network of experts aimed to prevent youths from becoming radicalised, reduce vulnerability and build resilience against violent extremism. The present paper examines 14 CRI in 5 different Eastern and Western European countries in relation to FLW’s identifying vulnerable youths and their provision of appropriate preventative strategies to violent extremism. This involves challenging Jihad and right-wing extremism and ideology and changing these opinions and behaviour.</p> <p>Method: One to one semi-structured interviews were conducted on fourteen FLW’s from 14 different European CRI (i.e. England, Wales, Northern Ireland, Poland, Germany, Netherlands and Denmark). FLW’s discussed their experiences of working in these initiative in relation to identifying vulnerable youths, best practice and the services they provide.</p> <p>Findings: Thematic Analysis revealed that FLW’s often use either primary and secondary prevention approaches, or a combination of these, depending on</p>

		<p>the individuals or groups. Primary prevention seeks to prevent the radicalisation process occurring in the first place and generally targets communities groups and schools rather than individuals. The focus is on educating youths, teachers and parents about Islam, Muslim culture and extremism. This is achieved using educational programmes, workshops, training and specialized speakers. Youths who are not vulnerable to radicalisation often perceive these prevention programmes and activities as fun and informative. Secondary prevention is aimed at preventing individuals shifting from cognitive extremist (i.e. opinions and beliefs) to engaging in violent extremist behaviour. The focus is on identifying the personal (i.e. grievances), social (i.e. disadvantage areas) and behavioural (i.e. efficacy) indicators render youths vulnerable to radicalisation. FLWs use different prevention strategies (i.e. mentors, discussion groups, multiagency approach, mothers, specialists) depending on the needs of the individuals. This involves changing individuals’ opinions and behaviour, which youths often perceive as challenging and difficult. These behavioural changes can be understood in terms of five BCT (i.e. shaping knowledge; substituting behaviour; support; comparisons and identity).</p> <p>Implications: The results have implications for FLW’s seeking to develop effective CRI to counter violent extremism and building resilience on the community (i.e. schools, mosques). It provides a better understanding of the most effective approaches in preventing and redirecting youths away from violent extremism and building resilience to radicalisation. BCT could be useful in designing behavioural change interventions that could improve existing initiatives.</p>
<p>PANEL SESSION: THREATS AND ISSUES I (11:20 – 12:50)</p>		
<p>Maxime Berube, Samuel Tanner & Aurelie Campana</p>	<p>Detrimental Capital Acquired by Survivalist Preparation within Right-wing Oppositional Movements</p>	<p>Survivalist preparation is a seldom studied social phenomenon, but it nevertheless raises various questions in terms of radicalization and extremism. Recent studies of North American right-wing extremist groups suggest that survivalism is on the rise within active and former members of these groups. Indeed, survivalism is a movement in itself, which is often mobilized by diverse oppositional movements. This ideological movement is based on the idea that a crisis or a catastrophe is forthcoming and that one has to get prepared to confront its potential consequences. Survivalists are mainly involved in two types of activity: stockpile for being self-sufficient, and self-defense/military training in order to protect themselves and their provisions against any social or political disorders. Regarding this second type of</p>

		<p>preparation, the literature suggests that one way for them to get this type of training is to join civilian communities doing military simulations.</p> <p>This presentation aims to examine how this tendency for survivalism within right-wing oppositional groups can increase their potential for violent acts. To do so, we address an understanding of the processes of radical commitment leading to such acts as the development of detrimental capital. This perspective is based on the assumption that delinquent behaviors are learned; such learning includes, on the one hand, techniques to commit the offense, and on the other hand, the adoption of certain types of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. Our previous research on Quebec's military simulation communities have shown that such an approach helps to better explain both why and how an individual directs this type of violence toward a particular target or uses a specific mode of action. This study is based on multiple data sources, including ethnographic observation, surveys, open source documentation and interviews, exploring right-wing oppositional groups or individuals involved in survivalist preparation. Based on these data, we argue that environmental mechanisms we have found in Quebec's right-wing oppositional groups constitute exactly what was absent from military simulation communities and provided an explanation to why we did not find any ideological radicalization within this context. First, in the military simulation context, we have observed some forms of informal social control in compliance with Canadian norms and laws, as well as unfavorable definitions for the adoption of delinquent behavior. Second, right-wing oppositional movements' environments rather suggest positive influences to the adoption of delinquent behavior and provide a marginal framework of informal social control. Thus, this presentation shows what we have learned from civilian military simulations, as well as the risk posed by survivalist preparation within right-wing oppositional movements. It therefore presents three types of learning leading to detrimental capital resulting from survivalist preparation in the right-wing oppositional movements: the development of strategic beliefs and attitudes, the assimilation of tactical knowledge required to plan an action, and the learning operational skills that may facilitate the commission of such acts.</p>
Cerwyn Moore	Foreign Bodies: Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the	This paper examines foreign fighters and the insurgency in the North Caucasus. The first part of the paper addresses conceptual issues concerning the ways that foreign fighters are analysed, posing this

	North Caucasus and 'Beyond'	<p>more widely in terms of transnational activism. Here I examine the importance of kin and relatedness. I develop this argument in the second part of the paper, which examines pan-Islamism and transnational activism in the post-Soviet period. The third section draws attention to the different groups of foreign fighters, as part of a wider activist movement in the North Caucasus. Here I show that a complex group of transnational activists from the Greater Middle East, North Africa, parts of Europe and Central Asia participated in the conflicts in the North Caucasus. Finally, the paper turns to examine volunteers from the North Caucasus who travelled to fight in Syria, concluding with some considerations about the reintegration of returnees and former activists.</p>
Manuel José Gazapo Lapayese	Terrorism and Cyberterrorism : The New Face of a Traditional Threat	<p>Introduction:</p> <p>The paper that we would like to present in Birmingham next September, "Terrorism and Cyberterrorism. The new face of a traditional threat", will seek to discuss the results of research carried out from various angles on the evolution of the terrorist threat over the last decade. As of 2015, we still lack a globally accepted definition of terrorism. On top of this, terrorism – a phenomenon presently undergoing a full transformation – is entering a new stage where cyberspace plays an increasingly significant role. These two facts, to which one could add the progressive fragmentation of the battlefield and the soaring growth of global technology use, make the true face of terrorism increasingly harder to describe and to combat.</p> <p>Consequently, the paper will try, first of all, to discuss the reasons that are hampering an agreement on the definition of the terrorist threat; secondly, to analyse why cyberspace has become terrorism's new battleground; and thirdly, to showcase the tools available for fighting not only terrorism, but also its dangerous virtual offshoot: cyberterrorism.</p> <p>The definition of terrorism:</p> <p>Interestingly, in spite of the facts that terrorism is one of the greatest threats to both national and international security and that no part of the world appears to be safe from it, there is no definition of terrorism that has been accepted by all actors in the international scenario. Among other problems, this has the result of making unclear what we are actually fighting against when we fight terrorism; therefore, when operations are carried out to fight or prevent terrorism they are at risk of being ineffective, since their target lacks a clearly defined profile.</p>

		<p><u>Cyberspace: terrorism’s new battleground:</u> In Birmingham we will describe how our research at the International Security Observatory has shown cyberspace to be a network of data interconnections where operations are carried out with no apparent geographical location and in apparently no time – where connections generate synapses so quick and numerous that retracing their steps back to their origin has become exceedingly difficult. These key factors are encouraging terrorists to resort to cyberspace: since it is virtually instantaneous, tracking down terrorist activity on the Internet is almost impossible. Therefore, terrorists use it increasingly often for cyberattacks, financing and spreading threats.</p> <p><u>Fighting terrorism:</u> An effective and efficient response to prevent and neutralise terrorism cannot be based solely on military intervention. We would like to make our audience in Birmingham aware of how it is fundamental to, above all, implement economic support, education and awareness operations to help deradicalise the countries at a greater risk of harbouring terrorist organisation. The terrorist phenomenon, with its multiple causes, provokes asymmetric conflicts; the proper response cannot be traditional warfare, but a multidisciplinary, multidimensional response touching on both the physical and the virtual world.</p>
Sagit Yehoshua	Radicalisation or De-radicalisation Process of Terrorist Leaders in Israeli Prisons and their Social-psychology Profile!	<p>This study investigate the Radicalisation or de-radicalisation process of terrorist leaders in Israeli prisons and their Social-psychology profile. The research was conducted with the cooperation of the Intelligence Department of the Israeli Prison System. The study is qualitative and was conducted through in-depth interviews with leaders of terrorist organisations in prisons around Israel.</p> <p>The purpose of this work is to form a better understanding of the conduct and mind-set of terrorist leaders held in Israeli prisons, and to assess the effects of the prison experience on them. It fills in gaps in the literature relating to the psychology of terrorist groups leaders in prisons by exposing the main aspects of their social, professional and personal lives as well as their attitudes and perceptions. This information was gathered by first hand interviews through repeated encounters with this type of leader and hence makes an original contribution to the literature, as well as to the practice of counter terrorism initiatives and policy-making by, hopefully, improving methods of communication, counter terrorism and conflict resolution.</p>

		<p>This study attempts to expand the knowledge in the field related to the social-psychology and profiling of terrorism in order to allow for a clearer sense of this phenomenon. As things stand, it appears that existing information and research regarding the psychology of terrorism is insufficient in depth and breadth to give researchers an understanding of the mind-set and behaviour of terrorists. The present research was conducted in Israeli prisons and will present unique first-hand information, gathered during more than a year of interviewing leaders of the most active terrorist groups that operate in Israel – Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad. The data includes the leaders’ life history, thoughts, mind-set, attitudes and social surroundings.</p> <p>The research focuses on five main themes:</p> <p><u>Social influence factors</u>: Adolescence, family, social surroundings, the organisation and their influence on the leader's adjustment to imprisonment.</p> <p><u>Personality profile</u> of the leaders and whether they have symptoms of a psychopathic personality based on Hare psychopathy check list (PCL-SV)</p> <p><u>Mind-set</u>: General perspectives such as rationalisations for committing terrorist acts, perceptions towards the victims, Israeli society and their actions in relation to the conflict.</p> <p><u>Leadership profile</u>: What kind of leaders are they? How do they perceive this position? How do they see their conduct and achievements as leaders? Would they want to continue their leadership position outside of prison?</p> <p><u>Imprisonment</u>: the effect of the prison experience and their radicalisation or de-radicalisation process.</p> <p>The main findings of this research suggest that the leaders of terrorist groups in Israeli prisons are going through a unique process while incarcerated, that no psychopathic personality profile was found among them and their rationalisations for carrying out the terrorist acts are quite varied. Furthermore, the findings of this study highlight the importance of the aspects of social surrounding and culture on the prisoner’s mind-set and conduct, as well as on their adjustment to imprisonment and their radicalisation or de-radicalisation process.</p>
<p>PANEL SESSION: ISIS (14:00 – 15:30)</p>		
<p>Lorne L. Dawson & Amarnath</p>	<p>Religion, Violence, and the Islamic State:</p>	<p>In recent years, governments, researchers, and the media worldwide have made a concerted effort to</p>

Amarasingam	Insights from Canadian Foreign Fighters in Syria	<p>understand the Sunni “foreign fighter” phenomenon, asking: Who is traveling to Syria to fight for the Islamic State (IS) and other insurgent groups, how, and why? A great deal has been learned, but outside of the data collected by security services, the public record remains rather fragmentary and incomplete. This presentation provides preliminary data and insights from research funded by the Canada Safety and Security Program into the backgrounds, experiences, and perceptions of most of the Canadians known to have left to fight with Sunni jihadi movements in Syria. The data is derived from analysis of over sixty interviews conducted with current and former fighters, their close friends and family members, and others associated with them in Canada. The findings will be placed in the context of the limited comparative data available from the United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and elsewhere, to establish patterns of similarities and differences, and to critically examine how the information contributes to our emerging grasp of the common elements of the process of radicalization. More specifically, in the case of IS, we will argue the need to take the professed religious motivations of the recruits seriously as primary drivers of their engagement. Insights into the historical development and composition of the leadership of IS have led some scholars to question the primacy of its stated religious objectives, as have normative and theological assessments of its claims to be acting in accordance with “Islamic” principles. But we will seek to show how dialogue with some of its rank and order fighters leaves little reason to doubt the “religious” character of their commitment and their conception of the unique goals and stratagems of IS. It is this aspect of IS that accounts for its remarkable success in attracting foreign fighters and the lethality of the threat it poses to others. The Islamic State is a “game changer” in the contemporary struggle with terrorism by virtue of the more explicitly utopian/eschatological nature of its mission, as understood by its members, whether we have fully satisfactory reason, at this time, to believe that the eschatological rhetoric of its leadership is genuine or not. In this key regard IS is behaving more like a new religious movement than other terrorist groups, jihadi or otherwise, and this interpretive framework will be instrumental in understanding its future actions and probably its ultimate fate.</p>
Nader Anaizi, Frederick H. Dotolo III &	Confronting ISIS in Libya: A policy statement for an	The authors have requested the abstract not be published in the conference proceedings.

Merouane Lakehal-Ayat	international and regional counterinsurgency	
Daniel Snook, Dan Richard & Debbie Dong-Yuan Wang	Fear of Terrorism Strengthens Support for Military Action against the Islamic State	<p>American public support for military intervention to address challenging international crises appears capricious. In 2003, American citizens supported (85%; Pew Research Center) the invasion of Iraq ostensibly to keep “weapons of mass destruction” out of the hands of terrorist groups. In 2013, the American public did not support the decision to intervene in Syria (24% supporting; Gallup Poll), even though the use of chemical weapons on civilians was more than a threat, but a reality. Currently, attitudes regarding military intervention to address the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are mixed, with approximately 57% in support of military intervention (Pew Research Center). American support for using military intervention is not a certainty and can shift as a function of many factors.</p> <p>Fear of terrorism and the perceived threat of terrorism have played an especially important role in determining support for U.S. military intervention. The American public’s high fear of terrorism in the years immediately following 9/11 has kept the threat of terrorism salient. Since 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, any Middle Eastern conflicts are likely to remind the American people of the threat of terrorist attacks. Even subliminal references to 9/11 raise people’s perceived levels of threat and thoughts of death. Fear of terrorism increases the salience of threats for past U.S. conflicts in the Middle East. This increase in threat salience should increase support for wars that are associated with terrorism, such as the Iraq War, or those that are similar to prior conflicts associated with terrorism.</p> <p>In previous research, we found that Americans’ support for using U.S. military force to intervene in the Syrian Civil War was influenced by dispositional fear of terrorism and the salience of implicit knowledge of the Iraq War. The previous study’s pattern of results suggested that priming participants to think of the Iraq War did not prime participants to think of terrorism in general, but specifically to Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The current study is an exploration into how implicit knowledge of past international conflicts and fear of ISIS. After being primed to think of the Iraq War, World War II, or no war in particular, participants read a description of ISIS and the surrounding conflicts. Participants then reported their levels of recommendation for resolving conflict with ISIS, including to what extent they would recommend that</p>

		<p>the United States intervene using military force. Participants with high fear of terrorism were more likely to support military intervention against ISIS. Fear of Terrorism seemed to minimize the effect of priming observed in previous studies.</p> <p>When Americans' make decisions about conflict with ISIS, fear of terrorism seems to override other decision-making factors, such as their experiences and knowledge of past conflicts. The pattern of results across two studies suggests that when fear of terrorism is high and immediately relevant, American support for military intervention is likely to be high. When fear of terrorism is low, the details of the conflict are likely to determine support for military intervention.</p>
<p>PANEL SESSION: TERRORISM, PIRACY AND ORGANISED CRIME (14:00 – 15:30)</p>		
<p>Joshua Regan</p>	<p>The Piracy Terrorism Paradigm: An Interlinking Relationship</p>	<p>The predominance of non-state actors in the last thirty years poses a major international security concern. This paper addresses the rise of maritime piracy and its connection to political extremism. To date, no research has empirically measured the relationship between these two variables. Using longitudinal data collected from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the Global Terrorism Database, this paper evaluates incidents of piracy and terrorism from 1985-2013 in three countries: Indonesia, Nigeria, and Somalia. The results from this study indicate that there is a positive relationship between piracy and terrorism. This has significant geopolitical implications for the international community. The findings suggest that as rates of piracy increase so will acts of terror. Policy measures and recommendations will also be discussed.</p>
<p>Nimsy Garcia</p>	<p>Terrorists, Insurgents, and Transnational Organized Crime: A Look at New Alliances</p>	<p>In an increasingly globalized world it is becoming necessary to explore the connections between terrorist organizations, insurgents, and transnational organized crime (TOC) groups. I believe that these groups are working together in order to expand their reach and to generate funds through the selling of illegal drugs. The cooperation between these groups poses a great threat to national and international security and by examining these groups together we will be better able to see the links between them and then create better policies directed at stopping the flow of illicit funds to these groups.</p> <p>These groups working together are a serious threat on many levels including: regional stability, national stability, and international stability. This paper begins by addressing the definitions, structures, aims, ideologies, and strategies of each group. From here I argue that although the definitions and aims of terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, and TOC</p>

		<p>groups are very different, there are overlapping values and actions that are worth exploring. The second section covers the various markets, banking systems, and methods of transferring money. The purpose of this is to highlight that each group generates funds in a similar manner and uses the others' banking systems to move money.</p> <p>Next, I will focus on the illegal drug market as this is how many groups are generating funds. Illegal recreational drugs are a multibillion dollar industry and terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, and TOC groups all play a part in the production and distribution of heroin, cocaine, and opium. To illustrate this point of cooperation this paper includes case studies in West Africa and South Asia.</p> <p>This topic is important to examine because although these factions are small, they are incredibly difficult to eradicate despite the billions spent on countering terrorism, insurgencies, and anti-crime efforts. At this moment the alliance between these three groups is out of necessity and the need to survive and although the definitions and aims of terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, and TOC groups are very different, there are overlapping values and actions that are worth examining. I believe these new alliances will create a paradigm shift into the new age of terrorism. Once these alliances are better understood we will be better prepared to not only counter terrorism but insurgent groups and transnational organized crime as well.</p>
Tina Billington-Hughes	How Cultural and Historical Links between Organised Crime Groups and Terrorists Make counter Measures Difficult	<p>Organised crime has existed for many years but globalisation has seen a monumental shift in the nature and culture of these activities creating a global logistical and political nightmare heightening the concerns of law enforcement and security agencies. Organised crime is often portrayed as an excitingly glamorous way of life run by tough old-school villains enticing their protégé promising money, social standing and possessions in return for loyalty, silence and discretion. The reality is very different. Organised crime is a highly lucrative international business that strikes at the very heart of local communities targeting the most vulnerable members of society. Terrorists, on the other hand, rely on financial incentives and their chosen protégé's desire for martyrdom. Countering the activities of these groups requires successful international partnerships between law enforcement and governments and often depends on the economic development and stability of other nations. This is where it becomes difficult. Outside Europe co-operation is often severely hindered by</p>

		<p>corrupt police officers, politicians and other officials. Not bound by law enforcement’s legislative constraints, organised criminals enjoy a borderless world offering them the ability to move and operate freely with vast opportunities to form mutually beneficial alliances with groups who share the same values, geographical proximities and language. It is these shared cultures and histories that create significant challenges for those tasked with counter measures.</p> <p>What has become increasingly clear, despite continued scepticism, is that Makarenko’s continuum between organized crime and terrorism does exist and is exceptionally multifarious.</p> <p>Pakistan based organized crime group D-Company, run by India’s most wanted man Dawood Ibrahim, and one of the world’s most proficient and feared terrorist organizations, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, are examples of such an alliance.</p> <p>In addition to cultural and historical links, the nineties increase in transnational organized crime and the oscillating nature of terrorism uncovered a plethora of similarities between the two groups particularly in the way they operate. Both groups are well established, powerful with a plethora of multifarious activities. These factors have resulted in the growth of both traditional and new-born threats that have formed a pertinacious interactive convergence with an underlying suspiciously perfidious nature.</p> <p>Both have strong links with other terror groups, particularly Al Qaeda, and with a hegemonic ideology that has traversed across several countries; they could be argued to be a universal issue that has successfully transcended the limits of local legislations.</p> <p>Despite the crime-terror nexus being a threat to national security the greatest threat, and undoubtedly where organised crime and terrorism will be at their most powerful, is the point at which they converge. Organisations such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and D-Company, if given carte blanche to continue their activities, have the potential to bring the world’s most nuclear efficient nations to war – Pakistan and India. This will have decidedly adverse ramifications worldwide which should be of serious solicitude to law enforcement, governments and intelligence agencies. Using the relationship between these groups, this paper examines how cultural and historical links between organised crime groups and terrorists make countering their activities extremely difficult.</p>
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PANEL SESSION: OLD AND NEW TERRORISM IN EUROPE (14:00 – 15:30)

<p>Giorgio del Vecchio</p>	<p>Political Violence as Shared Terrain of Militancy: Red Brigades, Social Movements and the Discourse on Arms in the Early Seventies</p>	<p>Although terrorism and social movements are two distinct historical phenomena, they showed during the Years of Lead some visible overlapping areas. Both arose and developed in the same period, between the late Sixties and the early Eighties. Almost all the western countries which were affected by the activity of the social movements experienced also the phenomenon of the clandestine armed struggle. Very often both the social movements and the terrorist groups mobilized or addressed the same social actors; they elaborated similar ideological structures and developed sometimes similar repertoires of action. Very often terrorism and social movements shared the political terrains which constituted the basis for the development of their corresponding idea of militancy. One of these overlapping zones was, in the Seventies, the issue of the violence. On the one hand the movements developed an increasing confrontation with violence as means of political action; on the other hand, terrorism interpreted the armed struggle as the only strategy able to achieve radical changes within the post-war societies.</p> <p>Italy is a privileged research field in order to investigate this issue. It is a delimited historical context that was simultaneously characterized in the Years of Lead by an extraordinary diffusion of violent practices, both within the social movements, the State apparatuses and the clandestine organizations. The author examines in this paper the existence of this overlapping zone relating it to the political violence issue in Italy in the first half of the Seventy Years, trying to show how some conceptualizing processes represented a sort of shared terrain of militancy for the clandestine armed struggle and social movements. In substance, a common plane of comparison is that the violence issue structured itself starting from shared discourses, which contributed to define forms and contents of the political militancy, either public or clandestine, leading often to diverse outcomes. The paper engages this matter interlacing three analytical levels. First, the historical context and the structural changes affecting Italy starting from the late Sixties will be examined, attempting to reconstruct how they influenced the development of social movements and of the Red Brigades, the most important Italian terrorist organization. Secondly, the manners in which the Red Brigades and the various movement's areas conceptualized the political violence will be analyzed in depth, starting from the close examination of specific instances and the analysis of</p>
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		<p>primary sources such as the militant press and the ideological elaboration produced by the Red Brigades. Finally, the research will focus on the political violence as a shared terrain of militancy, so as to highlight the forms in which, starting from these conceptualizing processes, movements and armed struggle perceived each other. The score is not to “absolve” or “condemn”, nor to retrace a mutual debate, but to consider the role played by these reciprocal perceptions in the definition paths of certain collective identities, out of the conviction that such an approach may supply new analytical research tools in order to “de-exceptionalize” terrorism and to understand it as historical phenomenon.</p>
Mark Littler	Who Supports the Terrorists?: A Quantitative Critique of the Idea of a ‘Terrorist Profile’ amongst British Muslims	<p>With a number of high-profile cases of young Brits leaving the UK to join ISIL, the question of the loyalty of British Muslims has again been returned to the headlines. Concern over social marginalization and online radicalization have combined to give rise to fears over a high-risk constituency of young, socially marginal and potentially violent British Muslims forming a high-risk 5th column within the UK.</p> <p>Yet despite academic research showing that Muslims present no greater risk of supporting terrorism than other UK groups (Sobolewska, 2013) and the broader cannon of research dispelling the idea of a terrorist profile (Hudson, 1999), policymakers and media commentators persist with talk of a ‘terrorist profile’, engaging in scaremongering about the threat posed by the sub-population of young, often male, British Muslims.</p> <p>Building on previous research on support for violence, this paper presents the results of a comprehensive test of the relationship between demographic markers and support for political violence amongst British Muslims. It offers the results of analysis using a nationally representative sample of British Muslim drawn from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study to argue that the idea of a high-risk profile is without merit. It places these findings in the context of both academic research on extremism and terrorist support, as well as the current policy response, offering a critique of the PREVENT framework and a discussion as to how it may be improved.</p>
Claudia Carvalho	Mothers and ‘Muhajirat’ – New Jihadist Strategies of Female Recruitment	<p>Mothers and ‘muhajirat’ (female migrants) are the new striking combination revealed in the last cases of female individuals intercepted in Spain while attempting to join the Jihadist fight in Syria together with their children. Drawing upon virtual and classical ethnographic work this paper proposes to analyse the</p>

		<p>impact of the newest online jihadist narrative among Islamic women. The image that emerges from the collected data online (Facebook) and offline (Catalonia, Spain) suggests a significant and differentiated Jihadist strategy to recruit women.</p> <p>What are these new hyperlinks and how are they renewing the phenomena of online Jihadism? What changes (both online and offline) did they accomplish among Islamic women? What are the new online Jihadist tools that are able to convert Islamic mothers into ‘muhajirat’?</p> <p>My argument is that these mothers enter an online process of radicalization where through enhanced visual stimulation (videos, photos, imagery) they feel emotionally linked to Jihadism and where through Islamic knowledge dissemination they find a religious justification for extremism. As a result, their cognitive appraisal and acceptance of jihadist violent practices will transform their offline behaviour, resulting into their recruitment and migration to Syria in the company of their children. The scenario is new, complex and defies the contemporary Study of Terrorism.</p>
<p>Anna Varela-Ray, Jovan Byford, John Dixon & Álvaro Rodríguez- Carballeira</p>	<p>The 'Right' of Using Violence: Interpretative Repertoires of Terrorist Violence</p>	<p>Legitimacy is key to political success. It allows those who are in power not to be questioned and generates the duty to obey to the followers. Organizations and institutions pay special attention to legitimacy, particularly when they anticipated criticism from external sources. In this vein, legitimacy becomes more significant to carry out acts of violence, which generate social and psychological rejection.</p> <p>In this regard, non-state groups, such as terrorist groups, have to do an effort to provide of meaning to their violent acts, that is to legitimate them. By legitimizing their terrorist attacks, the terrorist group avoids losing social support from their members and supporters, whilst their capacity of exerting social influence in the population is not affected. However, legitimacy is a flexible feature resulting from negotiating with its audience in order to deal with the changing socio-political context.</p> <p>Against this background, the objective of this study is to analyse the legitimization of violence of a terrorist group over time, and to find out how the terrorist group deals with socio-political change. For that purpose, the study takes ETA group as case study and specifically examines the period from 1964 to 1982. ETA group is the terrorist organization in the world that has been active for the longest period of time. The analysed period corresponds to the end of Franco’s dictatorship and the stabilization of</p>

		<p>democracy in Spain. Fifty communiqués of ETA have been analysed using discourse analysis. The sample was divided into two periods: The Franco’s dictatorship (1964-1976) period, and the democratic period (1977-1982). It is worth mentioning that the sample is unique and has not been analysed before, which is a novel aspect of the present research.</p> <p>Our analysis shows that three different interpretative repertoires have been used by ETA to legitimise its violent actions: the colonial rhetoric, the criminalisation of the outgroup and the use of violence as a political instrument. The colonial rhetoric and the criminalisation of the outgroup corresponds to the Franco dictatorship period and the third one was introduced in the democratic period without abandoning the others. The use of different interpretative repertoires in which embedded their violence allows ETA to redefine the moral order of the situation. In addition, these interpretative repertoires provide ETA with subject positions from which entails them in terms of action and participation. In this regard, ETA evolves from presenting itself as a victim and using violence as a defensive tool to define violence as a reflection of its agency and constitute a political identity.</p>
KEYNOTE (15:35 – 16:20)		
John Cuddihy	Keeping People Safe from the Threat, Risk and Harm Associated with Serious Organised Crime and Terrorism by Tackling Enablers and Making Them Inhibitors	
PANEL SESSION: MEMORY, IDENTITY AND NORTHERN IRELAND (16:35 – 18:05)		
Cathrin Ruppe	Irish Americans and the <i>Troubles</i> : Collective Memories and Identities in Terrorism Research	<p>Memory is a key factor in identity formation, as memory is embodied in us as part of who we are. The concept of memory is increasingly used in both historical and sociological research; my research is focusing on collective memories, and how these can play a significant role in group identity formation, which in turn leads to a collective social identity. These collective identities are shaped by commemorating past events and sharing cultural symbols and values, often based on positive associations with the past. This is especially true for immigrant groups who often try to create a nostalgic image of their origin country and culture in a foreign environment.</p> <p>When it comes to political violence and terrorism, it has been observed that terrorist organisations tend</p>

		<p>to emphasize the remembrance of past events for the present; collective memories are amplified, sometimes even created, in a bid to gain support for their movement. The question is hence how these collective memories are created and transmitted, either between individuals or groups. While the personal environment of an individual plays an important role in memory shaping, the influence of 'memory makers' and their use of the social dynamics of collective memory should not be underestimated. The expressive use of past events to create a 'guideline' for actions in the present, may it be to set these events right or to justify them, serves as an alluring appeal for people uncertain about their own (social) identity.</p> <p>The prime research interest lies on the issue of transgenerational memories and their influence on the support for terrorist activities. As terrorism is not a monolithic concept, there is the possibility to draw on aspects of low-key susceptibilities to collective memories and hence collective identities. These collective identities could in turn lead to the identification with the principles of terrorist groups as well as the motivation to act cooperatively. The principal focus lies on the attitudes of Irish Americans towards the <i>Troubles</i> in the 1970s and 1980s, dealing with aspects of passive and active support for the <i>IRA</i>.</p> <p>Therefore, the research is based on the following questions: How are collective memories created? What kind of memories (whether 'real' or implanted) might trigger the desire to support or even take part in terrorist activities? Is identity formation influenced by transgenerational memories, and if so, how? The answers to these questions could lead to a more informed, all-encompassing view of people committing terrorist activities, which is crucial for the future of intelligence analysis and policy-making.</p>
Donna Halliday & Neil Ferguson	Memory, Youth and Violent Extremism: Lessons from Northern Ireland	<p>In the wake of 9/11 the international community has sought to develop strategies and mechanisms to thwart the rise in Islamic extremism. A significant factor in this rise has been the number of young people involved in acts of terrorism and recruited by terrorist groups. As such, increasing attention has been directed at why and how young people are drawn into political violence in a bid to understand the dynamics and underlying factors in the mobilisation of young people towards violent extremism. Central to this has been an examination of the localities in which young people dwell and the role that communal and familial ties may play in the radicalisation or counter radicalisation of young people. Particular attention</p>

		<p>has been focused on the role of collective memory in shaping and maintaining cultural and social identities and the transference of those identities on to younger generations. Demonstrating that trauma experienced from previous conflicts, and unresolved issues emitting from such conflicts remain in the collective psyche, forming a collective memory that is passed onto younger generations creating an environment in which post-memory can develop. Little attention has been paid to the role and development of post-memory in younger generations within current debates on violent extremism and how this may influence young people who may see it as their role to right perceived wrongs. As such, this paper seeks to address the role of post-memory in shaping the identities of young people via an examination of how narratives of past 'histories; both national and personal can encapsulate and transfer trauma experienced by previous generations, onto younger generations thereby creating and maintaining resentment and hostility leading to a 'us' and 'them' mentality through the generations. Drawing on and employing recent research with young people in Northern Ireland this paper will consider the influence of communal and post-memory on youth via an exploration of how narratives of the past shape the social and political lens of young people and the potential implications this may have for understanding the roads into and out of violent extremism.</p>
Annabelle de Heus	Identity and the Dissident Republican Movement in Northern Ireland	<p>This paper seeks to explore the extent to which identity and group association has shaped the relationship between the Police Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and dissident republican groups. Many recent dissident republican actions have actively and specifically targeted members or property of the PSNI whilst the latter has significantly increased operations to counter this threat. With the upcoming republican commemorations including the centenary of the 1916 Easter Rising, dissident republicans remain high on the list of policing priorities. Therefore this paper explores the historical foundations as well as the contemporary expressions of the problematic relationship between republicans committed to the armed struggle and the Northern Irish security services.</p> <p>First this paper examines the general dynamics surrounding the relationship between dissident republicans and the PSNI from a historical perspective. Its theoretical foundation is based on Tajfel and Turner's integrative theory of intergroup conflict and social identity (1979). Historically, the position and actions of the RUC were distrusted by Catholic communities, especially in those areas where</p>

		<p>republican activity was at a high level. Internment, collusion and police brutality became inseparably affiliated with the RUC. Therefore one the key conditions of the Belfast Agreement was the reform of the police services to establish a fully supported police service, serving all sides of the community. The subsequent Patten report and policing reform has indeed greatly improved the relationship between the PSNI and the majority of republican communities.</p> <p>The second part of this paper focuses on those republicans that actively rejected the peace process and remain dedicated to the armed struggle. Empirical and secondary source analysis of their statements strongly suggests that in their opinion the PSNI is still to be perceived as an occupying British force and thus to be actively targeted. Active community policing on the part of the PSNI however has increased support of the general public towards the service, which has led to, as they have expressed themselves, greater engagement towards supporting active policing operations. By exploring the reactions to certain key events, including the deaths of Constable Stephen Carroll in 2009 and Constable Ronan Kerr in 2011 and the current upsurge of dissident activity in urban areas, this paper seeks to shed new light on the contemporary identity of dissident republicans as well as the PSNI's counterstrategy.</p>
<p>PANEL SESSION: COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY AND APPROACHES (16:35 – 18:05)</p>		
<p>Anne-Marie Balbi</p>	<p>Counter-terrorism as 'Peace'? – Deconstructing a CT Discourse based upon a Dichotomy of 'War and Peace'</p>	<p>The post 9/11 debate, and the subsequent international counter-terrorism (CT) discourse, has predominantly revolved around the narrative produced by America's 'War on Terror' (WOT). By framing the CT response as raging a <i>war</i> on terror the ultimate intention becomes to equalize to a status of <i>peace</i>. Therefore, the WOT terminology has essentially proposed that any CT measures put in place following the 9/11 attacks have been executed under the notion of promoting peace. However, as the WOT has in fact turned out to be a counter-productive response, providing for an increase in counterattacks rather than neutralisation, all CT policies have come under reconsideration. Should CT strategies be conceptualised within a definitional framework of 'war' and 'peace'? Does 'peace' in fact provide the antipode to terrorism? And <i>whose</i> peace? Or are there other possible theoretical frameworks from which to derive effective counter-terrorism measures?</p> <p>This paper will explore the notion of 'peace' as it has evolved to dominate the way in which we think and frame CT, and the way in which the CT discourse has been constructed in to investigate the validity of</p>

		<p>'peace' as the dominant theoretical framework for CT. Using a constructivist approach it investigates how CT can be framed as 'peace' by applying this theoretical approach to the empirical cases of the terrorist attack sites in Bali and Norway, exploring how the responses from local stakeholders can be understood from the thematic approaches of CT as 'peace', 'communication' and 'collective action'. In this sense, it is imperative to challenge and explore the current assumptions upon which CT strategies are constructed and deconstructed in a CT discourse that has been largely reliant upon a dichotomy of 'war and peace'.</p>
Jordan J. Colon	Counterproductive Counterterrorism: The Illogical Logic of Preventive Counterterrorism	<p>We live in a world shaped by a fear of the unknown. Where will the next bomb go off? Who will detonate it, and why? This fear has become part of the logic supporting and driving counterterrorism programmes throughout the world. As the perceived threat of home-grown terrorism has grown, security services have promoted preventive counterterrorism policies to tackle the threat. In this paper, I question the logic of fear and so called 'processes of radicalisation' which have shaped these preventive policies, in an attempt to discover if these logics are in fact illogical. Beginning with an examination of what preventive surveillance programmes are, using the NYPD's 2001-2011 community surveillance programme as an example, the paper progresses to the illogical nature of the founding logics of the programme. Firstly, the logic of fear—entailing a <i>need</i> to resort to ever stronger preventive counterterrorism policies—is tackled. The basis of the logic in hyped media and academic accounts of the terrorist threat is examined, along with survey data highlighting how the implementation of the NYPD's preventive counterterrorism programme has failed to lower the fear New York residents hold relating to the terrorist threat. The illogical nature of this logic of fear is also analysed, through an examination of how preventive policies themselves acknowledge and prepare for a failure to eliminate the terrorist threat. Stemming from this fear, another illogical logic has become a core feature of counterterrorism policies, the 'process of radicalisation'. Through an examination of the NYPD's four-stage 'process of radicalisation' the paper highlights how this core facet of preventive counterterrorism policies is rooted in a flawed concept of 'religious terrorism', that places religion and religious belief as the <i>cause</i> of terrorism. Utilising research from the debate on 'new' and 'old' terrorism, a reading of bin Laden's 1996 Fatwa, and an examination of IRA discourse, the paper presents an</p>

		<p>argument that this distinction is flawed and has led preventive counterterrorism policies to become not only illogical, but counterproductive. This counterproductivity is manifested in the creation of a suspect community out of American Muslims and Arabs, and an internal dichotomisation of these communities caused by fear of the NYPD's preventive programme. The paper closes with an argument that to achieve the aims of preventive counterterrorism, and to tackle the illogical logics that have supported the programmes, the programmes themselves must be scrapped and a new, inclusive approach, consensually engaging with all communities is needed in their place.</p>
Chi Zhang	Framing the Discourse of Terrorism in China	<p>My research focuses on the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in China. In particular, I seek to evaluate the capacities of the agendas associated with extremism, separatism and terrorism to increase or reduce ethnic tensions. Informed by Critical Terrorism Studies, this research is an attempt to shed some light on the relationship between the response of a government to terrorist activities and the consolidation of ethno nationalist identities within a group. This research seeks to articulate the dynamics regarding the increasingly radicalized ethno nationalist identities and its impact on the increase of political violence. Critical theories lend expletory power to the militant Uyghur issues in China, particularly in the following aspect. Firstly, the common accepted view that terrorism has posed an existential threat is questioned by critical scholars. It has been argued that the actual casualties caused by terrorist activities are in fact not as many as those caused by, for example, car accident. Therefore it is consequently suggested by them that terrorism should be de-exceptionalised and treated as one form of political violence. However, the impact of terrorist activities upon society, the terror it is able to create goes beyond the actual casualties. Secondly, Terrorism scholars are highly sceptical about the use of violence in counterterrorism, as force-based reaction tends to provoke further resistance. In the case of China, research shows that Han-Uyghur tensions have been intensified again after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009. Thirdly, critical theorists highlight the commitment to human security and a broad notion of emancipation, rather than a narrow commitment to orthodox notions of national security. The case of China provides a tangible example in this regard. The commitment to national integrity has largely overridden other aspects, which means that state security has been given the top priority while the practical situation is much more complicated,</p>

		<p>entangled with issues of human rights, identity formation and consolidation, horizontal inequalities etc. More broadly, the critical approach questions the ways in which counter-terrorism programmes are linked to projects of state hegemony and governmentality. It has been effectively argued that counter-terrorism programme has been used as an excuse to justify human rights violations and repressive policies designed to reinforce the control over ethnic minorities. However, Han-Uyghur tensions needs to be understood in a broader context of structural imbalance in society. Although the increased ethnic tensions have been effectively argued as a result of overreaction and heavy-handedness of counter-terrorism strategy, it does not immediately challenge the motivation of minority policies. Therefore, such argument is in need of re-examination. In conclusion, my research seeks to answer whether the government reaction has contributed to the escalation of Han-ethnic tensions, and subsequently the issue of ethno-nationalist separatism.</p>
<p>PANEL SESSION: THREATS AND ISSUES II (16:35 – 18:05)</p>		
<p>Muhammad Ali Shahidy & Travis Morris</p>	<p>Disseminating Jihad in Kabul: Incorporating the Jihad Marketing Typology in Context</p>	<p>The conceptual line between jihad and violent jihad is often blurred when marketed to Muslim audiences. This paper makes the case that in order to understand how Afghans respond to violent jihadi marketing campaigns, it is critical to identify and understand the current mechanisms of dissemination. Kabul, Afghanistan is a target area for individuals and groups intent on persuading audiences to adopt a particular version of jihad. This research focuses on how jihad is disseminated in Kabul both as religious concept and as a catalyst for violence. A jihad marketing typology (JMT) was created after analyzing digital and print data collected in Kabul. This paper defines each marketing typology in a comparative framework and is divided into three sections. The first section sets the context of jihad in Afghanistan. The second section outlines the JMT focusing on scope, method, and target. The third section analyzes how Afghans of any age, gender, ethnic group, and religious affiliation are constantly exposed to jihadi information. The paper concludes with several recommendations for practitioners and scholars who focus on Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Violet Cheung-Blunden & Pranita Ramanan</p>	<p>Can Empathy Exacerbate Intergroup Cyber Conflicts?</p>	<p>In the domain of interpersonal relations, empathy has been widely regarded as a valuable tool for peacebuilding (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Past research showed that if enough empathy is extended to a victim of violence, insight into the victim's plight gives pause to the aggressor and prompts bystanders to help</p>

		<p>(Eisenberg et al., 1988; 1989; 1991). In intergroup conflicts, however, both parties stand to receive empathy (Batson et al., 1997). One theoretical question is whether both kinds of empathy, one directed to ingroup members and one to outgroup members, have similar utilities in peacebuilding. We hypothesize that ingroup and outgroup empathy have opposite effects on group violence - directing empathy to the outgroup mitigates aggression whereas directing empathy to the ingroup exacerbates hostile actions.</p> <p>Study 1 used a cross-sectional design to examine how the group affiliations of 95 San Francisco college students (M=21.04 years, SD=3.01) were associated with antagonistic tendencies in the context of intergroup cyber-conflicts. Participants viewed a multimedia clip of a Chinese cyber-attack on the U.S., reported their group affiliations and their support for cyber-policies. The independent variable, group affiliation, was operationalized by four variables: Wang's empathy scale, belonging, blame, and responsibility. Two dependent variables were assessed using a 5-point scale from 1=not at all to 5=very much. A sample item in the 10-item antagonism scale is "declare war against China over their sponsorship of cyber espionage" and a sample item in the 8-item punishment scale is "freeze the Chinese companies' financial assets in the U.S." (Cheung-Blunden & Ju, 2015).</p> <p>As expected, the classic effect of empathy emerged in our results. Those identifying with the outgroup (Chinese) shunned antagonism and punishment. Participants with more Chinese trust ($r=-.37, p=.000$), greater empathy towards the Chinese ($r=-.19, p=.086$), and an inclination to assign responsibility to the U.S. ($r=-.29, p=.005$) discouraged the U.S. from launching counter cyber-attacks. The negative correlations were replicated in the other dependent variable – punishment (Chinese_trust: $r=-.50, p=.000$; Wang_Chinese_empathy: $r=-.19, p=.079$; US_responsible: $r=-.24, p=.019$).</p> <p>As hypothesized, identifying with the ingroup (American) showed an opposite effect on hostile intentions. Positive correlations were found between ingroup affiliation and support for aggressive (US_belonging: $r=.20, p=.055$; Chinese_responsible: $r=.25, p=.015$; Chinese_percent: $r=.20, p=.055$) and punishing cyber-policies (Chinese_responsible: $r=.20, p=.053$; Chinese_percent: $r=.20, p=.057$). Therefore, a person directing empathy towards one's own group is more likely to consider hostile actions towards the</p>
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		<p>outgroup.</p> <p>The inflammatory effect of ingroup empathy on aggression from Study 1 warrants further investigation in an experimental design. Study 2 randomly assigned 51 college students (M=18.58 years, SD=1.25) into two groups and their American identity was either accentuated or reduced using a 5-minute indication method. Manipulation check confirmed that the American group felt significantly ($F(1,50)=11.31$, $p=.002$) more ingroup empathy (M=50.79, SD=5.98) than the control group (M=40.71, SD=13.78). Using the same multimedia clip and cyber-policy measures, the group with induced American identity endorsed antagonistic cyber-policies (M=22.79, SD=13.59) significantly more than ($F(1, 49)=6.25$, $p=.016$) the control group (M=15.04, SD=7.94). The results in Study 2 confirmed that heightened ingroup empathy could exacerbate intergroup conflicts.</p>
<p>Panagiotis Arnaoutidis, Vassileios Gkrizis, Triantafyllos Karatrantos & Vassileios Theofilopoulos</p>	<p>Operational Tools for the Identification and Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Terrorist Acts</p>	<p>The basic aim of the paper is the identification and prevention of radicalization leading to terrorist acts, especially through the identification of individuals “would be” foreign fighters departing to conflict zones through the European external borders and of foreign fighters attempting to return to EU through the external borders as regular or irregular migrants from the Mediterranean routes.</p> <p>Key to our research is the development of the ability to help recognize the level of radicalization of a group (or individual) and if/when this is likely to change. In other words, how can we identify unusual change - as distinguished from regular change - that signals discontinuity from normality. Here we want to be able to recognize signs of change in the individuals or group’s state as a precursor to escalation toward violent extremism and terrorism.</p> <p>The main contribution to the research is the increase of awareness and capacity of Law Enforcement Agencies to recognize and respond to the final stages of radicalization of “would be” foreign fighters and foreign fighters. Specifically, the paper contributes to this outcome through the research of three basic operation tools: a) Observable Indicators, b) Infiltration and c) Joint Investigation Teams (JIT). Observable indicators provide the personnel of Law Enforcement Agencies and especially first line practitioners with the capacity to extensively detect and identify certain suspected passengers as would be foreign or be foreign fighters based on concrete and common indicators and first level identification criteria.</p> <p>Infiltration is a worldwide accepted police</p>

		<p>investigative act that is being used in a broad spectrum of crimes, since it is one of the most drastic and efficient investigative methods to achieve the goal of dismantling an organized crime group or a terrorist organization. In the case of indications of foreign fighters returning to Europe “disguised” as irregular migrants a Law Enforcement Agent (or an informer) who has assumed a false identity can infiltrate the group of these irregular migrants in order to gain the confidence of its members and gradually reveal their illegal activities and dismantle the terrorist organization.</p> <p>A JIT is an investigation team set up on the basis of an agreement between two or more Member States and/or other parties, for a specific purpose and limited duration. In the case of would be foreign fighters the infiltration can take place in the EU country of origin and the infiltrator can follow the radicalized group until the EU country – point of exit to conflict areas. This action of the infiltrator can take place in the framework of a Joint Investigation Team, since in the EU the competent Authorities of a Member State in order to battle with a transnational terrorist organization, such as an Islamist group, can ask for a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to be set up. The results of this research will increase the understanding of both conceptual and practical characteristics of radicalization and the modus operandi of radical groups and individuals and help the Law Enforcement Agencies to effectively prevent and respond to radicalization leads to violent extremism and terrorism.</p>
DAY 2:		
PANEL SESSION: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (09:30 – 11:00)		
Lyndsey Harris	Ulster Loyalist Paramilitarism: No Longer a Security Threat?	Drawing upon empirical evidence and applying a strategic theory approach to understanding Loyalist paramilitary activity, this paper provides an analysis of the present day security threat of the two main Loyalist organisations, The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). It explores the tactics and operational strategy of the UDA and UVF in historical context and offers an assessment of why both organisations have remained relatively quiet in response to an increased dissident Republican campaign in Northern Ireland. The assessment of a Loyalist campaign of strategic terrorism highlights that lessons learnt during the conflict have been and will continue to be applied by the UDA and UVF in the current climate in Northern Ireland. Consequently, allegations of Loyalist paramilitary involvement in the street violence during

		<p>the ‘Flags Protest’ in December 2012 should not surprise political commentators and, indeed, it is argued the potential prospect of Scottish independence should alert policy-makers to disquiet within a particular section of the Ulster Loyalist community who might choose to respond with violent action.</p> <p>Essentially, the strategic approach is concerned with explaining the choices and decisions available to actors. A central part of this enquiry involves the strategic analyst seeking to identify the value system of the chosen political actor. In previous publications the author has sought to demonstrate how using a strategic theory approach has revealed that the value systems of the two main Loyalist paramilitary organisations differ (Harris, 2011; 2008a; 2008b; and 2006). These findings continue to be overlooked in recent publications examining Loyalist paramilitarism, and it could be argued by policy-makers: In essence, it has been established that the The Ulster Defence Association’s (UDA) value system was said to contain notions of Britishness, which includes the desire to maintain cultural practices and the need to defeat the IRA to ensure the ultimate core value of the defence of ‘their’ communities. Conversely, Ulster Volunteer Force’s (UVF) value system can be identified as informed by notions of Britishness, which translated into a paramilitary mindset requiring the defeat of the IRA to maintain their ultimate value of loyalty to the Crown and preserving Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom. These differences have meant that at key moments in Ulster’s past and present both organisations have differed in their response to a number of political situations; for example, the UDA presented the idea of an independent Ulster in 1979, which maintained links to the Britain through Commonwealth membership (NUPRG, 1979). The UVF, on the other hand, would not have considered this a viable option given their core value of wishing to maintain the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It can be argued that these differences in values have influenced organisational approaches in considering how, when, and if they should cease to exist.</p>
Rory Finegan & Owen Foley	Targeted Killings in Northern Ireland: An Analysis of their Effectiveness and Implications for Counter-Terrorism Policies	This essay explores the effects of Targeted Killings (TKs) on rates of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) violence in Northern Ireland during the course of the Troubles with a focus on East Tyrone. An examination of data collated by the Conflict Archive on the ‘INternet’ (CAIN) at the University of Ulster for the period (1969-1992) suggests a number of patterns of

		<p>incidents worthy of closer scrutiny. In particular the geographical spread of data warrants further investigation. The scrutiny of the data from a statistical perspective provides an overview of the impact of the conflict; while the application of a qualitative adaptation of Hafez and Hatfield's framework presents a rich tapestry of data with respect to the impact of TKs. Theoretically, there is little agreement regarding the logical consequences of repressive measures in general on the strategies and tactical repertoire of insurgent groups. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) in their seminal work, identified four pillars of the Repression/ Rebellion Puzzle which tests the widest range of hypothesis, specifically, that terrorist targeting: (1) Deter militant organisations; (2) Produce a backlash effect; (3) Cause a disruption effect and (4) A diminishing capacity when combined with other security enablers. This hybrid study has found that TKs over a prolonged period predicated on accurate intelligence had no discernible deterrent effect on PIRA; the desire for backlash was always inherent but negated by security forces measures; with regard to disruption, TKs as implemented in East Tyrone had a cumulative effect on the operational capability of PIRA; and finally in relation to diminishing capacity while PIRA initiated substitution equally under this pillar TKs caused a gradual but incremental decline in operational efficiency and effectiveness .</p>
<p>Matthew Lewis & Shaun McDaid</p>	<p>Bosnia on the Border? Republican Violence in Northern Ireland During the 1920s and 1970s</p>	<p>Contemporary unionist politicians have argued that republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/unionist community in those areas. This public narrative has been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature, and media accounts which draw upon it, that have failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This paper interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide-range of theoretical literature on categories of violence, and archival sources, it demonstrates that republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators' self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. In so doing, the paper engages with a contentious and contemporary debate about terrorism, the analysis of which may lead to more nuanced understandings about the nature of violence in Ireland. This concept is designed to move scholarly</p>

		discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and also has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.
PANEL SESSION: THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM (09:30 – 11:00)		
Lorraine Bowman Grieve	Vengeance as a Terrorist Motivator	The role of vengeance as an emotive driving force in both individual and group explanations for involvement in terrorism has long been recognised and while vengeance is generally perceived as being emotionally driven, it can be manifested in actions and activities which are strategic and logical; there are functional aspects to vengeance. However, even in such cases where vengeance is functional and strategic, an emotional imperative can be recognised as a driving force. This paper explores the role of vengeance in the motivation to become involved with terrorism on an individual level, and the promotion of vengeance at a group level. Discussed here are a range of examples of vengeance, identifiable within the sphere of terrorism, which have some explanatory value based on the ‘desired outcomes’ of the vengeful act as a terrorist motivator; these include blood vengeance, vigilantism, and death squads. Highlighting the importance of individual explanations of involvement, moral justifications, and group solidarity, ‘vengeance’ in discourses supportive of terrorism are analysed. From a psychological perspective, vengeance can be conceptualised in a number of ways, as a predisposing factor to individual involvement; a factor that contributes to keeping the movement ‘bound’ together, but which can also negatively impact the group’s strategic logic; a factor in the escalation of violent activity through vigilantism, retribution and retaliation which can result in a perpetuation of a cycle of violence; and a moral mandate that is ideologically rationalised and justified, with perceptions of righteousness and obligation inherent to it. This paper maintains that while the explanatory value of ‘vengeance’ should not be overestimated nor should it be overlooked in terms of its potential utility toward understanding individual and group motivations toward terrorism. The perpetuation of violence over time relies on discourses that provide the justifications necessary to ‘inspire’ continued action and involvement, from this perspective propaganda that promotes vengeance may be central to this end.
Emily Corner	Empirical Exploration into the Discrepancy of Mental Disorder across Group-Actor	Sociological theories of terrorism purport there to be an inherent lack of mental disorder across terrorist offenders. More recent evidence highlights that this lack of disorder is exclusive to group-actors. Disorder

	Terrorists	<p>prevalence within group-actors is far lower than lone-actors, the general population, and multiple crime types. This study seeks to identify the mechanisms causing this discrepancy. Expanding on Corner and Gill's (2015) comparative analyses of group and lone-actor terrorists. This research utilises three unique data sets (a lone-actor dataset from Gill et al (2014) and Horgan et al. (Forthcoming), a group-actor dataset created from open source data concerning individuals active in the US and Europe between 1990 and 2014, and a second group-actor dataset built from autobiographical information). This paper seeks to identify underlying mechanisms causing such a discrepancy in prevalence of mental disorder. To test this, a series of hypotheses concerning early life experiences, selection effects, roles, engagement, disengagement, and stressors are tested. Results and implications are discussed.</p>
Anna Cornelia Beyer	Bringing Mental Health back into Terrorism Research	<p>It is here argued that two very different but equally feared phenomena – schizophrenia and terrorism – are initially caused by the same processes but present as different responses due to differences in social structures (inclusion and isolation). Assume an individual is exposed to a threatening situation to its survival. These could be of economic or other nature. The individual will experience stress, which will result in the fight or flight response. So far, this is healthy, but if the stress persists (as with many for example economic threats posed by globalisation to many individuals around the world that cannot be countered by either withdrawal or aggression) the response might turn pathogenic. A prolonged flight response might present as withdrawal in an individual that does not have the social resources to resist. Schizophrenia is found in many young urban migrants, but also the general population, and is more present in deprived areas where social integration is lacking. It is known that the first episode of schizophrenia is often caused by trauma and stressful events. Inequality in addition is a risk factor as is isolation, and both present social and economic threats to survival. This might mean individuals at risk are prolongedly exposed to threats to their survival for which they lack the means to counter them. This might lead to a prolonged stress response of withdrawal (instead of aggression), which presents as the prodromal phase of schizophrenia. Behavioural coping mechanisms common in the withdrawal response are also common in schizophrenia, such as substance abuse and lack of motivation in particular. An excess of the flight response over long duree might manifest in paranoid</p>

		<p>schizophrenia, with delusions of persecution, for example. Why delusions would follow this response is yet unclear, but it could be a coping mechanism. In individuals with more social support, meaning individuals, which are better integrated into a strong community, there might be the capacity to respond to the same stressors with the fight response rather than the flight response. This might explain why terrorists occur in areas where minorities are under threat (with ethno-separatist terrorism for example) and why terrorists are usually not schizophrenic. An exception might here be the lone wolf terrorist, who might be at the borderline between a schizophrenic response to prolonged stress and following isolation but might retain the capacity to choose the fight over the flight response. Isolation has been identified (along with depression) as one potential cause for radicalisation in the West and has been used as an explanation why Western citizens join ISIS. Likewise, the need to belong and the importance of groups have been identified as causal for terrorism. Terrorist groups are also arguably in part caused in their emergence by marginalisation and oppression.</p> <p>This paper will review the literature on social and psychological causes of schizophrenia. It will then compare these with the social and psychological causes of terrorism. It will conclude with some tentative recommendations for a more successful approach towards terrorism.</p>
Saima Löfgren	The Role of Clinical Psychology in Understanding Individual Pathways to Radicalisation	<p>Psychology has a long established role in profiling terrorists and, more recently, those deemed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. However, it is not possible to understand the individual pathways to radicalisation through looking at specific characteristics, precipitating factors or risk factors. As a Clinical Psychologist my professional remit is to support individuals to draw together their version of their narrative; that is, to formulate their understanding of their life experiences, thoughts and feelings that have led them to where they are today. Therefore, the focus is on the individual and their idiosyncrasies, although it is also important to look at the wider social, political and educational context in which that narrative has been brought to life. In my work with young women who have been radicalised I have to simultaneously hold their individual experiences, their experience of their family, community and culture, as well as of mainstream society, specifically education. There is a continuous negotiation between these factors causing a degree of tension, as evident in my casework.</p>

		<p>The negative portrayal of Muslims and, specifically, of Muslim women as oppressed is seen today in the media reporting of ‘Jihadi brides.’ This concept constructs Muslim women as lacking agency by implying that were it not for sexual oppression they would not seek husbands in Syria and were it not for a lack of critical thinking arising from hierarchical structures within their communities, they would not buy into ISIS. Although in my clinical work with such women I have found that some aspects of their life may be viewed as restricted, we must not overlook the question of what pushes these women away from us. That is, not just <i>us</i> in the Muslim community but from <i>us</i> in the UK; these women have not simply left home to seek a better life in a different place, they have rejected both their cultural community and the British community at large. Based on my background as a British Muslim female clinical psychologist working with the government’s prevent strategy, the aim of this presentation is to share a clinical psychological framework for working with individuals deemed to be vulnerable to extremism. As part of this I hope to offer a critique of current policy and intervention strategies through drawing on my current casework and experience.</p>
<p>SYMPOSIUM – ETHICAL ISSUES IN TERRORISM RESEARCH (11:05 – 12:20)</p>		
Tore Bjørge		The general principles of research ethics obviously apply to research on terrorism and political extremism.
Lorne L. Dawson		Just because we are studying people who carry out some really nasty acts does not mean we cannot forgo any or all of the ethical obligations we conventionally have with regard to those we are studying. But research with these respondents raises some complex and potentially controversial issues that we need to discuss more fully and openly.
Amarnath Amarasingam		<p>Just because we are studying people who carry out some really nasty acts does not mean we cannot forgo any or all of the ethical obligations we conventionally have with regard to those we are studying. But research with these respondents raises some complex and potentially controversial issues that we need to discuss more fully and openly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which ethical frameworks and constraints apply to diverse analytical roles (academic researcher, investigative journalist, intelligence analyst, etc.)? • How far does the requirement for informed consent go when it comes to research on terrorists / extremists? • How far does the requirement of openness about the purpose of the research project go? • How far does the requirement for confidentiality and anonymizing data go in research on terrorists and violent extremists? • Who is it legitimate to interview? (e.g., what about Breivik and other mass murderers?) • Whose interests does our research serve? • To what extent can authorities require

		<p>academic researchers to disclose the identity of their interviewees and what they have told researchers? And how can researchers protect themselves and their data from such legal interventions?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the researcher obligated to report certain information to the appropriate authorities, when and how? • What measures need to be taken into consideration to protect the safety of researchers? • What are some of the pertinent differences in the standards of research ethics applied in different nations? <p>It is time for frank discussion of these and other pressing issues as more researchers respond to the repeated call for more primary data on terrorists/extremists. An edited volume may be a suitable way to explore some of the significance issues and solutions.</p>
<p>PANEL SESSION: USING THEORY TO EXPLAIN TERRORISM (13:30 – 15:00)</p>		
<p>Asta Maskaliūnaitė</p>	<p>Bringing Theory Back into Terrorism Research</p>	<p>Terrorism studies is an evolving field periodically experiencing waves of self-criticism. Articles and entire books appear focusing on the vicissitudes of the terrorism research, yet, year after year they lament the same faults of this endeavour: lack of definition; focus on the “current events” and neglect of history; lack of rigorous theorizing and methodology; lack of collaborative research; distance from research subjects; flourish of false experts, etc. These issues can become so pervasive as to lead to a sombre observation that ‘there is no agreement among terrorism experts about what constitutes useful knowledge.’ (Stampnitzky 2013, p.12-13)</p> <p>In this presentation, I will focus on the problem of theory in the terrorism studies. I will argue that even though claims that there is no theory in terrorism studies and that research has gone stale are exaggerations, more effort should be put into bringing theory back in. For that purpose a number of assumptions need to be abandoned. First, the “new” vs. “old” terrorism debate should be put aside. The “new” terrorism might indeed be qualitatively different in its tactics, but the motivations of those engaged in “old” type of terrorisms can be assessed similarly as those of the new and the contextual variables while somewhat different in all cases are not necessarily more different in time than they are in space. Focusing on the differences between the “old” and “new” terrorism only impedes us from using available data for creation of theoretical models.</p>

		<p>Second, the primacy of raw data over theory should be reversed. Over the last years, a lot of emphasis has been put on gathering as much “field” data as possible. Loud complaints about the lack of data has resulted in a selection of studies that are based on field research. Emphasis on “meeting the terrorists” have given its fruits and we currently have more factual data about various terrorist groups and individual terrorists than ever before. At the same time, advances in theory have been meagre. I will argue here that it is time to change the emphasis. There is enough data, especially if we also consider historical studies, on which theories can be built and there is no need for the scholars to jump onto exploration of each new threat (yesterday Al Qaeda, today ISIS, tomorrow something else), but to focus instead on creating theoretical frameworks in which to assess such groups.</p> <p>Third, the eclectic nature of theorizing on terrorism should not be seen as an obstacle for the creation of robust theories, but as an opportunity to enhance the understanding of the phenomenon. For that purpose, more attention should be given to theory building, more intellectual effort into making them more solid, more emphasis on linking historical cases of terrorism. It is worth remembering and reapplying the theories developed to explain previous waves of terrorism, such as Donatella Della Porta’s use of protest cycles (Della Porta 1995) or “organizational” approach of Martha Crenshaw. (e.g. Crenshaw 1985) Re-examining such works and building on them as well as finding new approaches would give the necessary perspective to the study of terrorism and, hopefully, would bring us sooner out of trance when a new group is formed and some more brutal attacks suddenly take place.</p>
Trevor Calafato	The Similarities between Lombroso’s Theories on Political Crime and Contemporary Terrorism Issues	Terrorism is considered to be a very contemporary issue and for some terrorism came under the limelight only after 9/11. Yet when looking at the history of studies on terrorism and political violence it is possible to traces back documentations from the nineteenth century. This paper will look at how Lombroso researched and studied political violence and terror in the nineteenth century. Although Lombroso is much better known for his claims concerning the origins of criminal behaviour, he was among the first to propose social science as a route to knowledge of anarchist violence. In his books on anarchists and political criminals, which are virtually unknown, he proposed that the reasons behind anarchist violence would be found in social conditions, psychological states and

		<p>religious grievances. He developed techniques to study these links, such as combining information from maps and statistical data over time to examine the likelihood of revolts occurring in particular regions of the country and to develop specific counter-measures. This study compared Lombroso's work with perspectives of academics on studies of terrorism and how current people in the field expect to implement security policies and potentially counter terrorism. This paper will show that though extremist actors may use and change different technologies according to different eras but their fundamental motivations and instigating factors remain almost identical and this resonates Lombroso.</p>
<p>Johannes Saal</p>	<p>The Dark Social Capital of Religious Terrorist Groups: A Preliminary Examination of the Explanatory Potential of Social Capital Theory for Terrorism Research</p>	<p>Many scholars acknowledged an era of "new terrorism" characterized by a growing number of religiously motivated terrorist organizations which are responsible for a proportionally higher number of casualties, often by relying on suicide attacks. But religion is largely neglected in the literature on terrorism. It seems that terrorism research's often criticized lack of the linkage between general theories and results from social sciences impedes the analytical access to the contentious and ambivalent relation between religion and, particularly, suicide attacks. Social capital theory possesses the potential to overcome these shortcomings. The concept's variables trust, reciprocal norms, and social networks as important resources for cooperation obtained popularity among social scientists. Social capital is hereby often described as primarily relevant for the institutional performance of democratic systems or social inclusion. However, already Robert Putnam emphasized anti-social externalities by differentiating between bridging and bonding effects (1994, 2000).</p> <p>Terrorist acts are mainly conducted in the course of campaigns by groups of individuals sharing ideological and strategic goals. While organizations generally face dilemmas of collective action, especially terrorist groups are prone to free-riding, respectively defection, due to their clandestine and endangering nature. Trust constitutes thereby a precondition for cooperation between individuals. Usually, it derives from intense interactions with friends or family members, but can also emanate from shared religious and/or ethnic identities. Because ethics are an integral part of almost every religion, religious norms of reciprocity are a strong driver behind trust-building. As the radical Salafist concept of jihad exemplifies, norms can foster a strong notion of in-group altruism by creating obligations towards God and Ummah.</p>

		<p>Concomitant with antagonism and demonization, such segregation processes possibly result in individual radicalization and the willingness to kill others who are perceived as heretics.</p> <p>Besides cultural aspects, the socio-structural characteristics of groups determine whether bridging or bonding social capital is generated. Dense networks produce social cohesion, foster solidarity, “thick” trust, intense interactions, commitment, and conformity towards group behavior and attitudes. The importance of density becomes especially evident in regard to recruitment. Since terrorist cells are so-called small worlds, bonding family and friendship ties are crucial in mediating recruitment processes by minimizing the risk of infiltration and defection. But the importance of bridging terrorist cliques and their environment to increase network growth and performance should not be underestimated. In case of religious terrorist organizations, associated religious communities often create opportunity structures for a broad variety of members, even for those who are usually marginalized in other networks. By connecting the group to other communities, organizations, religious and secular alike, religious networks establish informal contacts between different people which can be exploited by terrorist networks for recruitment and receiving support. Consequently, the concept of social capital promises, in one hand, a theoretical framework to analyze factors like the effectiveness of collective action, radicalization, and recruitment which are crucial for the success of terrorist intentions. On the other hand, it implicates policies aiming on de-radicalization and social integration as additive and corrective for previous counter-terrorism strategies solely focusing on security and law enforcement.</p>
Shane Drennan	Mixed Signals: Political Opportunity and Influential Allies of the Warden’s Dilemma	<p>The political opportunity approach within social movement theory is often used to explore the dialectic between the state and a movement that creates and shapes the movement’s opportunity to form and act. However, social movement makers understand that there are affective dynamics potentially in their favor beyond their relationship with the state. In order to create a movement of unstoppable, critical mass, movement makers sometimes seek to gain the attention of external influential allies so that they influence the state. To explicate this particular process of creating political opportunity sufficient for statewide cognitive liberation, I use Karin Fierke’s “Warden’s Dilemma” as a theoretical underpinning for understanding how the tripartite relationship between the state, the people, and external “influential allies”</p>

		works. To ground this theoretical work, I use the example of the US as an “influential ally” sending mixed signals the anti-regime movement in Syria affecting its reaching cognitive liberation on a statewide scale.
PANEL SESSION: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA (13:30 – 15:00)		
Ernest Ogbozor	The Consequence of Violent Extremism on Rural Livelihoods in North-East Nigeria	The effect of violent extremism on livelihoods and the resilience of communities are relatively understudied. This paper addresses three key questions: Does livelihoods and struggle for resources contribute to extremist violence? What are the effects of extremism on rural livelihoods? And what are the livelihood strategies for coping with extremist activities in Northeast Nigeria. Using the desk research technique and semi-structured interviews. This study contends that the the struggle for livelihoods and resources has a correlation with extremism violence, and the effects of extremism on livelihoods have both direct and the indirect impacts. The study concludes, recommends the application of the sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) in assessing the strategies employed by communities to cope with extremist violence. This approach investigates sensitive issues in an insecure environment by asking questions about how people live.
Onyebuchi Chima	The Boko Haram Terrorist Group in Northern Nigeria has carried out...”: Terrorist Groupings and Actions as the Political and Electoral Determinants	Although various local and international studies have explored the steadily growing democratisation of Nigeria polity since the emergence of Nigeria Fourth Democratic Republic on May 29 th 1999, no similar study exist on the actions and influences of terrorist groupings on the election of Nigeria Presidents. This paper begins by exploring the historical emergence of terrorist groupings in Nigeria political and electoral process from 1999. It then extends its focus on the actions of the terrorist groupings and their intended political influences as well as their consequent effects on electioneering designs and arrangements. It further explores the influence of terrorist activities on the political engineering processes and on the electoral psychology of Nigerian electorates. Whilst acknowledging that there are limitations to the political influences of terrorist groupings, the paper particularly explores the impact of Boko Haram activities in Northern Nigeria on the persuasion and voting patronages in the recently concluded 2015 Nigeria Presidential and national elections. So while Nigeria democracy since May 29 th 1999 may be said to have thrived, most particularly on the economic front, the security challenges and the rapid rising of terrorist activities is not an uncommon outcome of the shifting and re-shifting of ‘Presidential resources’. This brings

		to focus the questions about whether: 'who and where the President is from' is either provocative or appeasement to Nigeria terrorism? Why there has been changing pattern of responses to terrorist activities in Nigeria? All these questions comes up against and were reshaped during the recent Nigeria Presidential elections and it induces a discourse on if indeed the bandied notion that Boko Haram is anti-Western education terrorist group is no more but a politically induced grouping that lies beneath the North-South political divide.
Willie Aziegbe Eselebor	Power Politics and Boko-Haram Insurgency in Nigeria	Security is a public good, but the current insurgency situation in Nigeria suggests a mix of isolated complexity of intrigues, snowballing into security failures and a tragic doom. The paper aims to analyse, in essence the dissonance of power politics and proffer non-military solutions in order to contend with identified problems. The undersupply of public security created space overtime for non-state-sponsored terrorism to thrive; leaving a gap which has left pundits wondering as to what went wrong, further questioning the capacity of the state to offer protection and what lessons, if any for the future. Several theories of socio-economic, religious, relational and conspiracy themes emerged, while none sufficiently explain the problematics like the political context explored as a framework for analyses in this discourse. Evidences from document survey established that there are high fatality rates leading to culpable distress and threat to lives and properties from Boko-Haram activities, its affiliates and radicalised supporters; which must be addressed. Furthermore, government production of security has been decimated by fragility driven by fluxes and long standing political tensions by aggrieved individuals or groups of persons. This has generated negative sway on the state response mechanisms, which is mired in high-wired politics at the local, national and regional levels, having effect on military triumph. Countering this trend requires de-politicisation of the problem, strong institutions, connecting with the local communities and neighbouring countries amongst others.
PANEL SESSION: OTHER CONSIDERATIONS (13:30 – 15:00)		
Nick Brooke	The Dogs That Didn't Bark: Evaluating the 'Negative Cases' in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence	It has been said that far more attention is given to the 'few cases of communal violence than... the normal situation of ethnic peace'. The literature on terrorism and political violence covers in depth the reasons why some national minorities, such as the Irish, Basques and Tamils, have adopted violent methods as a means of achieving their political goals, but the study of why similar groups (such as the Scots and Welsh) remained

		<p>non-violent, has been largely neglected. In isolation it is difficult to adequately assess the key variables behind why something <i>didn't</i> happen, but when compared to a similar (violent) case, this form of academic exercise can be greatly beneficial. This paper demonstrates precisely what we can learn from studying these 'negative cases' - nationalist movements that abstain from violence - particularly with regards to how the state should respond to minimise the likelihood of violent activity, as well as the interplay of societal factors in the initiation of violent revolt.</p> <p>This is achieved by considering the case of Scotland, which recently underwent a referendum on independence from the United Kingdom (accomplished without the use of political violence) and comparing it with the national movement in Northern Ireland, looking at both violent and non-violent manifestations of nationalism in both territories. I argue the way in which national identity is constructed is an important factor in the likelihood of violent confrontation between the state and its national minority, and that states can decrease the likelihood that nationalist movements will turn to violence by ensuring non-violent means of political mobilisation are perceived as legitimate and viable alternatives.</p>
Art Kendall	Some Ways to Exercise our Scientific Responsibilities	Dr. Kendall will present ideas on what our responsibilities are. He will describe how many large scientific societies have formed a Coalition to further human rights. Several projects of the Coalition will be described. The On-Call Scientists system will be outlined: how NGOs can request help from scientists, how scientists can volunteer, and what some of the projects are. He will also discuss the value of supporting human rights in countering terrorism
Dan Victor Cavaropol & Carmen Valeria Chervase	Developing Effective Response to CBRN Terrorist Acts: Case Studies in Romania	Romania is not a country with a high rate of terrorist acts, however, in the recent years, due to the enlargement of the EU, the criminality trends have increased and crime takes more and more various and dangerous forms. By means of our EU Project we are implementing this moment, we would like to raise awareness of the authorities on the risks and dangers which terrorist acts using CBRN can cause and present specific theoretical and practical solutions that allow for immediate and medium-term strategies, as well as suggesting an institution-centered plan for theoretical and practical training of the law enforcement personnel in this regard.
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION – THE IMPACT OF SYRIA ON COUNTER TERRORISM IN THE WEST MIDLANDS (15:15 – 16:30)		
West Midlands		

Counter Terrorism Unit		
KEYNOTE (16:30 – 17:15)		
John Morrison	Reloading the Armalite? A Critical Analysis of the Violent Dissident Republican Threat	For many the threat of Northern Ireland related terrorism has been confined to the history books, one of the darkest parts of our history never again to be revisited. Peace has come to the region and the bomb and the bullet no longer dominate the political landscape. They have been replaced by debates on welfare, housing and electoral pacts. However, there is a tiny minority of the population who wish to retain the utility of violence. Most dominant amongst these are the violent dissident republican groups. This talk seeks to analyse the threat posed by these violent dissident republicans. Through the analysis of primary source interviews, group statements and quantitative event based data the talk will seek to give an understanding of the aims of these groups, their tactics, strategies and aims. This talk will finish by assessing the relevance of the decade of centenaries that the island of Ireland is going through at the moment and question whether these can be used by the violent dissident republican groups to re-launch their campaign.