Conference Programme

Day 1

Session 1: 9:35am-10:45am

Conceptual Debates in Terrorism Research (Room CC1.01)

Anthony Richards (University of East London): Conceptualising Terrorism: Worthy Endeavour or Forlorn Hope?

This paper will suggest that there are a number of good reasons for persevering with the endeavour to reach a universally agreed definition of terrorism, notwithstanding the formidable obstacles. It will, firstly, consider whether there really is anything qualitatively distinctive about terrorism compared with other forms of political violence, and, if so, what it is that is unique about the former. It will then propose some preliminary assumptions that can be made when approaching the definitional issue. Finally, the implications of these assumptions for how one ultimately conceptualises terrorism will be considered, before a general definition of the phenomenon is offered.

Asta Maskaliunaite (Baltic Defence College): Origins of the Concept of Terrorism and their Reflections in its Contemporary Use.

Many books and investigations into terrorism start by lamenting the lack of an agreed definition of terrorism in the field. Already in the seminal work of 1982, *Political terrorism*, Alex Schmidt discussed 109 definitions of terrorism and disagreements among scholars as to their content. Later, in 2012, the Volume *Contemporary debates on terrorism*, edited by Jackson and Sinclair, dedicated three out of twelve chapters to the problem of defining and understanding the phenomenon. Thus, even after half a century of focused research into the subject, the issues of the conceptualisation of terrorism are still as important as ever. At one and the same time, the choir of those who suggest that the term itself is too loaded to be useful and should therefore be abandoned is growing ever louder. In such circumstances, it might be useful to look at the concept of terrorism from a more detached historical perspective and investigate the controversies that first surrounded the term when it appeared in the political lexicon. Already from its inception during the French Revolution, terror and terrorism has been laden with serious normative weight and its justification or abnegation filled the concept with different contents. In the first of these positions, terrorism appears as rational, directed, morally justifiable (at least in some circumstances) and strategically plausible. In the other, it is seen as irrational, random, immoral and without any strategic purpose but destruction. The third understanding of terror – often forgotten – is actually also present in the French Revolutionary discourse, namely the terror of crowds, which is seen as just, though unruly, and purposeful, though misguided. These positions never managed to overcome one another and their influence over policy and academic discourse has fluctuated over the last two centuries with one or another gaining (temporarily) the upper hand. Using Koselleck’s ‘history of concepts’ and Laclau’s and Mouffe’s discourse theory as a theoretical background, I propose to look at the ‘semantic struggle’ surrounding the concept of terror in its earliest manifestations during the French Revolution and its immediate aftermath. I will then look into the usage of the term 200 years later at the height of ‘war on terror’ and explore the differences in the semantic fields surrounding terror then and now. I will argue that though the contemporary use of terror on the surface seems to have adopted it counter-revolutionary representation, this representation still operates in a semantic field where ‘terror’ needs to be connected to, juxtaposed or opposed to, the notions of ‘virtue’, ‘liberty’, ‘democracy’, ‘violence’ and ‘despotism’. I will discuss the possibilities of salvaging terrorism as a term through looking at it as a ‘floating signifier’ which only gains its meaning inside a certain discourse. I will discuss the variations of this meaning through the lens offered by the three understandings of the French
Revolution and examine how they play out in the certain political (I will use Spain as an example) and academic discourses, thus delineating three different discursive uses of the term and their repercussions.

Dimitrios Delibasis (Air University): Non-State Actors of Aggression: Within the Concept of Self Defence.

This paper explores the potential for an effective and realistic response to the mounting threat of globalized and networked terrorism, which appears to have succeeded in defeating the classic nation state national security paradigm that has existed since the late 19th century. The paper starts with a historical outline that describes the evolutionary phases of terrorism arguing that this is not a static phenomenon but one that exists in a mutually affecting relationship with international legal order and war. It then sets forth the basic features of 21st century globalised “Market State” terrorism and the specific challenges they pose. The next step is to explore this new form of terrorism within the concept of self-defence, setting the parameters for seeking recourse to force against Non State Actors. The final section of the paper examines the actual need for a new paradigm with regard to this new kind of terrorism we face both in the domestic and the international front. It finally closes with a concluding section, which notes that the issue at hand signifies nothing short of a time of change that calls for a rethinking of our ideas with regard to terrorism, war and their respective relationship with law.


On 10 August 2012, the High Court of Australia handed down its decision in *The Queen v Khazaal* [2012] HCA 26. This was a noteworthy event for a number of reasons. First, and most obviously, the decision had a significant impact on the defendant, Belal Khazaal. It reversed a 2011 New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal decision to quash his 2008 conviction for collecting or making documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts (a serious terrorism offence under Australian law) and to order his retrial. In doing so, it reinstated the original conviction as well as the 12 year sentence that had been imposed on Khazaal at first instance. Second, *The Queen v Khazaal* was the first case involving the substantive anti-terrorism offence provisions of the *Criminal Code 1995 (Cth)* (“the CCC”) to have been appealed all the way to the High Court. As such, *The Queen v Khazaal* is an important addition to the jurisprudence on anti-terrorism law in Australia. Third, the handing down of the High Court’s reasons for decision came one day after the Prime Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard, had announced the commencement of a government Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation, chaired by a recently retired New South Wales Court of Appeal judge, Anthony Whealy QC. This coincidence of timing focuses attention on what the case reveals about the myriad difficulties associated with the operation of the legislation under review and, particularly, the problems that exist with the current definition of the phrase “terrorist act” in the CCC. Whilst undoubtedly a significant decision, *The Queen v Khazaal* is not the only case to highlight the shortcomings of either the anti-terrorism offence provisions of the CCC in general or of this definition in particular. Over the past ten years, a number of completed prosecutions in Australia have cast light on just how complicated, layered and conceptually difficult to work with the CCC’s anti-terrorism offence provisions are for both practitioners and juries. Those cases also demonstrate that an important aspect of this conceptual difficulty is attributable to the complexity and density of the definition of “terrorist act” itself. This paper will examine the recent Australian case law involving prosecutions for terrorism offences in order to assess the role of the definition of “terrorist act” in creating and amplifying the complexity of the anti-terrorism provisions of the CCC. It will conclude by suggesting amendments to the definition of “terrorist act” that are designed to address the identified problems.
Legal and Academic Discourse in Terrorism Studies (Room CC1.18)

Sudhir Chander Hindwan (Panjab University Chandigarh): New Challenges of Terrorism to World Peace: Strategies about Countering Terrorism

Present world order is in the midst of a major transformation, largely on account of rapidly changing value system across the globe. Transformation is seemingly ubiquitous concept. Whilst some view it as a source of aggrandizement, others treat it as a disruptive process. Despite years of concerted efforts to eliminate major threats, terrorism, caste violence and class violence have managed to taunt us time and again. It will certainly be naive if we blame others for the problems we face. To a great extent we are equally responsible for the mess. It is good to preserve one’s identity for maintaining our diaspora. But at times such efforts of preservation of identity, whether cultural, linguistic, regional or religious damage the deep layers of our socio-political system. It is apparent from the kind of threat we are encountering so often. The world is also gradually witnessing the over expansion of a parochial version of faith and the desperate attempts of promoting it as the only pious one, but history bears testimony to the fact this has happened due to hegemony of the majoritarian identities and resentment of multiculturalism particularly on account of migration, the problem of refugees and search for survival in the competitive world order. The research paper is an attempt to examine and analyse the concept of religious pluralism, its challenges, particularly the deadliest challenge of modern terrorism, its genesis and changing nature of the problem and its causes. Besides, the paper attempts to analyse and suggest:— (1) Some preventive methods for the removal of the grievances of the people, thus striking at the roots of the problem. (2) Security constraints in dealing with the problem of terrorism? In this regard a careful analysis of the causes of suicidal squad of terrorism could be great use. (3) To answer the questions arising out of social pluralism. (4) To find answer to the main question-why have been people searching for religious and cultural safeguards against the stark realities of hunger, deprivation and poverty? (5) In changing environment the security apparatus and police need to diversify its activities by bringing together technical and professional expertise based on many decades of experience in maintaining internal security. In this regard the most crucial thing is to develop capability to anticipate security needs. This is possible by conducting specialized courses for monitoring security situations and how it can be done is the major theme of my research paper

Itai Sneh (City University of New York): Preventing Torture as the Human Rights: Universal Ethics and Utility as a Call for Theoretical and Practical Action in Counterterrorism

Torture is a time stopper. The Body is fixated, often deformed. Space is typically confined to a small cell without access to light or the outside world, to friends, to other prisoners, often not even to guards, just to perpetrators. Victims do not usually know what time it is, what day, sometimes what week, month, or season, or where they are. I am currently writing a book on the history of torture in global history. The questions that I focus on are: What was the policy utility of torture for the regimes that applied it? What were the reasons for the cruelty of torture? History shows humans repeatedly apply torture against each other as an integral part of their physical, political, cultural, and religious realities. Was torture a necessary agony of violence to uphold law and order or maintain stability? Is torture a by-product of armed conflicts over territories and allocation of resources? Torture involves a fundamental paradox of agenda and principle: It is an act of aggression against political, religious, and ideological foes advocated by leaders and even some jurists despite the progression and incorporation of human rights into binding laws worldwide. To better understand such contradictions, I analyze torture and its consequences in significant junctures throughout Western Civilization from the Code of Hammuribi through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Barack Obama’s administration. Is resorting to torture a sign of regime weakness? There is an inherent conflict of interest: those who apply torture allegedly for public reasons benefit personally from the widespread fear they create. Core concerns include whether torture functions as a practical mean to security ends? Did torture help reach victory or conclude with favourable peace? Was torture used by authoritarian rulers, doomed for oblivion due to the oppressive nature of their
power, to crush independent and grassroots ambitions? Since 9/11, especially the legislation of the USA Patriot Act, much of the discourse in American politics has been one of exclusion rather than the promotion and the protection of diversity, tolerance, and pluralism. The Bush administration asserted extraordinary powers. It redefined what is "right" and what is "wrong," who belongs to "us" and who is part of "them." The Bush administration felt comfortable applying torture techniques such as "waterboarding" against suspected Moslem fundamentalist terrorists. These victims were different in many ways-nationalities, ethnicities, complexion, religion, and outlook-from Americans, which account for their vulnerability in the days of fear and sentiments of revenge that followed 9/11. My presentation will synthesize the exploration of the time dimension in torture with the lack of human rights as creating an unbearable pain and solitude.

Jessie Blackbourn (The University of New South Wales): Independent Reviewers of Anti-Terrorism Laws as Effective Oversight Mechanisms

Anti-terrorism laws are often enacted in haste and in response to an actual or perceived crisis. This has produced legislation that tests the boundaries of human rights compliance and which has the enduring capacity to alter the legal landscape and parliamentary and public perceptions of legislative norms. In this context, meaningful and effective oversight of anti-terrorism laws is of critical importance. This oversight function has traditionally been performed by the three branches of government, in particular, through pre-enactment parliamentary scrutiny and post-enactment judicial review. The decade since September 11 has demonstrated that such oversight is inadequate. An imbalance has been created due to the concentration of power in the executive and an increased deference to this branch of government from the legislature and judiciary. New oversight mechanisms, in particular offices of independent review, have therefore been established with the ostensible purpose of ensuring that there is review of anti-terrorism laws. In order for these new offices of independent review to do so, they must perform their oversight function in a meaningful and effective manner. This means that they must be truly independent from the executive whose laws are the subject of review; the review process must be methodical and consistent; it must be transparent; and it must be able to hold the executive to account. Furthermore, through publication of critically informed reports, the reviewer should feed into both public and parliamentary debate on anti-terrorism laws. This paper examines the offices of independent review in Australia (Independent Monitor) and the UK (Independent Reviewer) against these criteria. The UK’s Independent Reviewer was established in 2001. It is a non-statutory office that is not governed by a strict set of guidelines or procedural requirements. As such, it is problematically dependent on the personality and preferences of the office holder. For example, the first Independent Reviewer, Lord Carlile, was strongly criticised for failing to provide any meaningful scrutiny of the UK’s anti-terrorism laws. The Australian government sought to improve on the UK’s system in its establishment of the statutory position of Independent Monitor in 2010. The Monitor is subject to a strict legislative framework which regulates the establishment, function and powers of the office, as well as the appointment and termination process. This paper evaluates whether the Australian office of Independent Monitor has offered an improvement on the UK’s Independent Reviewer. It does so to assess the broader question of whether offices of independent oversight can provide truly effective and meaningful review of anti-terrorism laws.
Many scholars worldwide contributed with their knowledge in understanding terrorism. Every scholar dealt with a different angle of this crime and used certain method in order to approach the issue. The result of that is we have different interpretations of the definition of terrorism, alongside with the variation of the theoretical frame. Despite the variation of the interpretations, some theoretical approaches repeatedly occur in the available literature. These theoretical frames identified by some scholars, such as Sageman (2008), Boyns and Ballared (2004), and Albert and Omar Lizardo (2004). Sageman (2008) identifies the theoretical frames in understanding terrorism as: bibliographical approach, searching 'root causes' and the search on how people in groups influence each other. His argument on how to study terrorism is based on what are the benefits and negatives of each method. Sageman believes that every aspect of terrorism has its own preferable theoretical approach. For instance: he prefers to focus on how people influence each other in a group to understand the mechanism of radicalisation. On the other hand, Sageman thinks the scientific approach should support every theoretical frame. On the other hand, Boyns and Ballared (2004) identify three trends of the sociological theory for understanding terrorism. These three trends according to them are: spectacularization, criminalization, and fragmentation as explanations for terrorism. The spectacularization method reflects the scholar’s views on terrorism and agenda of countering terrorism. Boyns and Ballared think that scholars who follow this method usually look at terrorism as a threat that needs an immediate response, this response usually made by governments for funding and restricting civil liberties. On the other hand the second method; criminalization, it based on the belief that law is capable of countering terrorism. This method is usually supported by governments. The third trend is fragmentation which offers an examination on how governments are addressing the social problem of terrorism. This paper Analysis examples of the academic debate in English literature engaged with 9/11. Then the paper examines the respond of Arabic literature to the different approaches. It is worth noting that before 9/11, Arabic discourse shied away from discussing subjects such as, international Islamic international law, or Islam and the state. Only after the incident of 9/11, Arab academics and religious scholars urged the necessity to discuss excessively about subjects such as: Jihad, Dar al-Harab and Dar al-Islam. The mission of Arab scholars dedicated to face the international and the internal challenges. The incidents of 9/11 put the Arab world in an accusation position as they were seen as exporting terrorism to the west. On the other hand, the internal challenges similarly important, as scholars have to face the ideological war of radicalisation.

Session 2: 11:00am-12:00pm

Radicalisation and Pre-Attack Behaviour (Room CC1.01)

Noemie Bouhana (University College London): Explaining Radicalisation: Theoretical Integration and the Problem of Cross-Level Interaction

Criminology has come to the realisation that while most prominent criminological theories have some power to explain crime, that power is rather limited, as starkly illustrated by David Weisburd and Alex Piquero in their 2008 Crime and Justice article, “How Well Do Criminologists Explain Crime?” To add insult to injury, the problem does not seem to have abetted with time. Rather than experience the whittling-down process which characterises mature scientific disciplines, criminology has witnessed an explosion of explanations, accounts, theories, and models of crime, none of which seem to have entirely replaced older frameworks, and many of which are supported by some statistically significant findings. In the 2011 volume When Crime Appears: The Role of Emergence, editors Jean-Marie McGloin, Christopher Sullivan and Leslie Kennedy argue for a shift in focus away from variable-based (or risk-factor based) explanations, towards process- and mechanism-based theories, as a possible remedy to the problem of theoretical fragmentation. Theoretical refinement, they contend, requires the organised and explicit integration of all levels of analysis (individual, situational, social ecological, macro-social) in a manner that clearly articulates the "interaction rules" (interaction effects and mechanisms of interaction) between these levels, which result in the emergence of criminal behaviour and crime patterns. This paper argues that terrorism studies should take up a similar call, if the field is to produce ever-more-powerful explanations. The case is made that not only must we ask what individual, contextual or macro-social factors matter, we must also ask how (and therefore when) they matter, hereby tackling the problem of cross-level causal interaction. Here, an attempt to address the problem of integration is presented in the form of the IVEE model (Individual Vulnerability, Exposure, Emergence) of radicalisation. Interaction effects and interaction mechanisms, their role and importance in the explanation of radicalisation, are illustrated with early findings from a study of prison radicalisation in the United Kingdom.

Munir Zamir (Fida Management): Conceptual Framework Applied to Current Radicalisation

This proposal is written on the basis of research carried out by Mr Zamir on typologies of radicalisation and their effectiveness in addressing threats from Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism. The research findings have been drawn from two sources. Firstly, from a MSc thesis submitted to the University of East London in 2012 which drew on conceptual analysis and discussion on radicalisation concepts and Al-Qaeda narrative and how they have been applied to the UK Counter-Terrorism strategy Contest and in particular the Prevent strand. By analysing the conceptual framework applied to current radicalisation discourse in relation to the changing nature of Al-Qaeda and UK counter-terrorism policy a number of key considerations and issues are raised by the findings. Using academic and practitioner perspective, this presentation will outline how conceptual deficiencies in current discourse are contributing to greater misunderstandings of the Al-Qaeda threat in the UK context. The key parameters and findings of the research as well as its implications will be expressed via a presentation followed by discussion.
Academic interest in Muslim youth, Islam, radicalisation and Islamic inspired terrorism exploded in the aftermath of 9/11 with the fundamental aim of discovering what was the connection between Islam and terrorism, radicalization and terrorism, but also how to detect and understand those who might become involved in either or both. Radicalization as a process has increasingly become associated with Muslim youth, particularly male Muslim youth, as the precursor to Islamic inspired violence against Western states. In an effort to understand these youth, the \textit{radicalization} of or potential radicalization of Muslim youths is linked in the literature to alienation due to living in separate or parallel communities, identity crisis and intergenerational conflict. Because of this, terrorism, radicalism and extremism have become tangled with notions of identity, integration, segregation and multiculturalism and this entanglement made being a \textit{Muslim youth} a precarious designation in the UK. This paper examines some of the concepts that are central to the process of radicalisation as it is described in the literature and using empirical data from a study with Muslim youth in the UK the study examines the realities of the emergence of new transcultural identities and generational change amongst Muslim youth in the UK as a feature of the lived experience of these youth rather than as evidence of some process of radicalization.

\textbf{Alexander Hitchens (Kings College, London): Jihadist Radicalisation in Kenya}

The author recently undertook a field research trip to Kenya, where he interviewed a number of former al-Shabaab members as well as religious leaders. The main purpose of the trip was to collect information on the ongoing radicalization of Kenyan Muslims, who have been joining al-Shabaab in Somalia since the end of the last decade and have even taken part in terrorist attacks within their own country. Despite al-Qaeda’s long associations with the country – one of its first major strikes as a global jihadist group was on the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 – it was until recently almost unheard of for indigenous Kenyans to be involved. As the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), an alliance of East African militaries which includes a significant Kenyan contingent, has steadily succeeded in removing al-Shabaab from power in every major Somali region, the militia has sought to lash out by attacking neighboring countries involved in the fighting, and Kenya has found itself firmly in the crosshairs. Kenyan Muslims have been recruited not only to travel to Somalia and fight AMISOM and Somali government forces, but also to exact revenge on Kenyan soil for its supposed role in the war on Islam. Between 2011 and 2012, there have been over 17 jihadist attacks in the country which involved either grenades or other types of explosives and automatic weapons. They have targeted a mixture of night clubs, police stations, bus stops and Christian churches. Thus, the ideology of al-Qaeda and its affiliates has yet again shown its ability to transcend culture, race and nationality and mobilize people in its cause. The strategies and tactics employed to achieve this vary depending on geographical location, as do the motivations to join up, and the Kenyan case should be added to our understanding of this phenomenon. Al-Shabaab’s ability to recruit and mobilise Kenyan Muslims to join its ranks in Somalia and to carry out attacks within Kenya is due to a number of factors which will be analysed in this paper. Among them has been the group’s ability to take advantage of and exploit the Kenyan military incursion into Somalia in October 2011, presenting it as an extension of the West’s ‘war on Islam’. The group has also been greatly assisted by a network of Kenyan jihadist ideologues who control mosques in Nairobi and Mombasa, from which they recruit individuals to join the fight in Somalia. Like many other al-Qaeda regional affiliates, al-Shabaab has shows an adeptness at tailoring the global jihadist ideology so that it is relevant and appealing to its local audience. It has developed a media strategy that specifically targets Kenyans and other Kiswahili speakers in the region, and offers a useful case study into the regional adaptability of global jihadist actors. This paper will use primary sources and information gained from interviews with former Kenyan al-Shabaab members and religious leaders working against al-Shabaab to provide an analysis on the ongoing threat of jihadism in east Africa.

A lack of empirically-based research has been one of the key problems facing the field of terrorism studies. Given the difficulties inherent in finding and gaining access to available primary sources, this is perhaps not surprising. Locating (former) terrorists who are willing to be interviewed by researchers can be a time-consuming and difficult endeavor, just as it can prove very challenging to gain access to information on terrorism collected by branches of the government such as police forces and intelligence agencies. In lieu of such empirical data, authors are frequently consigned to rely on potentially less accurate and less reliable sources such as newspapers or to cite other publications that do so. This presentation is based on ongoing PhD research on the so-called ‘Hofstad group’, a loose network of young Dutch Muslims who attained notoriety after one of the individuals associated with it, Mohammed Bouyeri, murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004. Like many other instances of ‘homegrown jihadism’, research on the Hofstad group is frequently marred by a reliance on sources of questionable reliability and accuracy. This PhD research hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the factors that played a role in the rise and development of this network by studying it from structural-, group and individual-levels of analysis and by using as much empirical data as can be attained. These sources include interviews with stakeholders such as public prosecutors and (former) members of the Hofstad group itself, as well as government archives pertaining to the investigations into this network. The aim of this presentation is twofold. First, it discusses the obstacles and opportunities encountered when trying to find and utilize these empirical sources. These range from assessing the accuracy and reliability of the various sources from which the information is derived, to protecting the privacy of the individuals under investigation and maintaining academic accountability. For instance, while police files are a very rich source of reliable information, they are not objective records as their primary purpose is to amass evidence that can be used to prosecute the suspects in court. There are also practical difficulties such as how to find former terrorists and convince them to agree to an interview? In the second part of the presentation some preliminary findings will be presented. What do the available empirical sources tell us about the origins and development of this homegrown jihadist network? By discussing ongoing research, the presenter hopes to inform the attendees about the obstacles and possibilities posed by utilizing primary sources based data and to share some new insights into the Hofstad group, one of the most well-known cases of homegrown jihadism in Western Europe.

Cyber Terrorism (Room CC1.18)


This article discusses the future trends in terrorism by looking at the changing profile of terrorism over ideology, organization and structure as well as the means and methods used in terrorism. First, the article examines how the ideologies used by terrorist organizations together with their goals and motivations have changed. Second, it elaborates how the organizational structure of terrorist organizations has changed with reference to the network and hierarchical structures of terrorist organizations. Third, the article is dedicated to look at the means and methods of terrorist organizations with special attention to the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombing. Other features of terrorism like cyber terrorism, the growing interconnectedness and interdependency between organized crime and terrorism and the nexus between piracy and terrorism is also addressed. The article argues that there is both change and continuity in terrorism since it is a historical phenomenon and intends to contribute to the discussions on the future of terrorism.
Violet Cheung and Jiarun Ju (University of San Francisco): The Unique Cognitive and Attentional Biases in the Anxious Reaction to Cyberattack

As post-industrial societies become more dependent on technology, they are also encumbered by greater risk. One common emotional reaction to technology-based hazards is anxiety. Anxiety has been found to adversely affect information processing (perhaps by undermining the shifting and inhibition of attention) and leave individuals with a poor grasp of the nature of the threats (Cheie & Visu-Petra, 2012; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987). Thus, the emotional state may internally induce a form of information deficit that leaves the public uninformed of the issues and ineffective in democratic participation. Although the cognitive and attentional biases have been widely studied in anxiety research, it is unclear whether the biases are unique to anxiety or shared by other emotions. The two opposing views were instantiated by Barlow (2000) who emphasized the unique cognitive antecedents, defensive motivational systems, neural underpinnings, and action tendencies of emotions, and by Russell, Lewicka and Niit (1989) who highlighted arousal and valence as the shared features of emotions. According to cognitive interference theory, anxiety impairs the effectiveness of information processing because worrying introduces task irrelevant thoughts that hijack cognitive resources from proper use (Sarason, 1988). Newer findings on attentional bias shed light on the information processing deficit and found anxious individuals regulating their arousals by disengaging from threatening information (Cheie & Visu-Petra, 2012; Derryberry & Reed, 1996). The avoidance of information, according to Mogg et al. (2004), happens later in the information-processing stream, while early information is left intact. Hence, a two-stage, vigilant-avoidance model of attentional allocation, has been proposed. In line with the cognitive interference theory and the vigilant-avoidance model, the present study focuses on investigating whether cognitive interference and attentional bias are unique features of anxiety. We hypothesize that a) a poor grasp of the detail is a unique feature of anxiety, and b) information processing in an anxious state of mind is worse for details that appear late in the storyline than those offered early in the news report. In two studies, participants (155 undergraduate students in Study 1; 392 adults in Study 2) completed an online survey. They watched a news report on an incident of cyber terrorism and responded to 9 multiple choice items to reveal their grasp of the story. The difference was that Study 1 was cross-sectional where participants reported their anxious, angry and fearful reactions and Study 2 was experimental where participants were randomly induced anxiety or relaxation and responded to emotion items in manipulation checks. Results from both studies showed that anxious participants had poorer recalls of the news story. Recall was unrelated to any other emotions. In terms of recalling specific parts of the storyline, information towards the end of the story was ineffectively processed by anxious participants in Study 1. The time course was not as apparent in Study 2 with the two groups of participants differing only in the recall of the middle portion of the story. Overall, anxiety, whether naturally occurring or induced, can produce information deficits when processing cyber threats.

Dimitrios Delibasis (Baltic Defence College): The Cyber Battlefields of the 21st Century: The Need for a Strategic Doctrine

This is an attempt to explore the potential need for a new legal doctrine that will tell us not only what we are supposed to do in order to deal with the security challenges Cyberwarfare has brought forth but also tell us under what exact circumstances we are going to do it. The paper starts by showing how Cyberwarfare’s structure, tactics and targets have allowed modern Non State Actors to acquire weapons and strategies that were historically reserved to States at war and also to deploy them without being limited by State violence constraints or physical borders. It then outlines how the global, networked and decentralised nature of Cyberwarfare, that allows even small groups acting for themselves or for other non-attributable State sponsors to deliver devastating blows against the critical infrastructure and population of even powerful countries, calls for a specifically tailored legal doctrine. The paper concludes with a short argument about the fact that Cyberwarfare may force a shift in our defence goals making them more proactive instead of reactive, in order to prevent certain
states of affair from coming into being. This is not likely an easy transition, however, are we better off if we risk doing nothing?

Valentino Desousa and Reena Sujelan (iDefense Custom): Are the Actions of the Al-Qassam Cyber Fighters the First Overt Successful Cyber Terrorist Attacks Against the West?

Operation Ababil was an operation launched by the al-Qassam Cyber Fighters on September 18, 2012 as an act of retaliation against the now notorious film called ‘Innocence of Muslims.’ Intelligence company’s around the globe witnessed the online campaign rise in solidarity by conducting attacks against US banks. Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters targeted more than 30 financial entities in the U.S including Wells Fargo, BoA, PNC, Citi, HSBC and more with successful Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. The group communicated their demands via the popular Pastebin, continuing to warn and list targets on the popular site. After targeting HSBC, the group claimed to postpone their attacks for Eid, returning on December 10, 2012 attacking more financial institutions. The multiple attacks in one day and difference in language confirmed this was a group and not a single person. Finally, after mass successes in taking down targeted financial institutions, the Qassam Cyber Fighters reached their goal, to have the video with the most views taken offline. Although it is not confirmed whether this was due to government demand, YouTubes removal of the video or a request to the poster to remove the video. Since this success, the group realized their attacks are bringing the results they intended on achieving, acting as a big ego boost they continued to make demands for the removal of the remaining videos. As of the 27 February the group has issued an ultimatum to the US Government, that unless the remaining videos of ‘Innocence of Muslims’ are removed from YouTube, OpAbabil will commence again on March 05, 2013. In this talk, the authors Valentino De Sousa and Reena Sujelan will discuss in brief Operation Ababil, the methodology of the attack, the perpetrators and motives behind it. The authors will continue with a definition of cyber terrorism to then compare with operations that share similar targets such as: OpShamoon and OpWeeksPayment. The authors will also discuss the role of a DDoS attacks as a potentially legal form of protest in the cyber world. Often legal representatives of Anonymous have brought this typology of discussion to support their clients. In conclusion, the authors will analyze the role of entities and governments in attributing acts of cyber terrorism.

Denise N Baken (George Mason University) and Ioannis Mantzikos (King's College, London): Cyberwarfare and Nigeria’s Vulnerability

In August 2012 Boko Haram reportedly hacked the personnel records databases of Nigeria’s secret service. The individual who successfully compromised the covert-personnel data system indicated the breach was executed in the name of Boko Haram and as a response to Nigeria’s handling of interactions with the group. The retaliatory attack revealed the names, addresses, bank information and family members of current and former personnel assigned to the country’s spy agency. The attack would not have tremendous significance in and of itself. However, it represents a substantial shift in tactics for a group whose name connotes an anti-Western stance. Until recently Boko Haram attack strategy was far from technological. However, since its association with Al Qaeda, Boko Haram has demonstrated a vastly changed approach to executing its attacks. Attacks are now more violent and reflect the markings of training by al Qaeda personnel. Given that cyber-space has been part of the terrorists’ warfare tool kit since 1998 when the Tamil Tigers executed a distributed denial of service attack, and al Qaeda has used the Internet as a vital communication vehicle since 1996, Boko Haram’s incorporation of cyber into its arsenal is almost inevitable. More importantly though, Boko Haram’s access to an individual who can execute such a successful attack is indicative of the cyber arsenal workforce capability available to any group or nation that wants to employ it. Boko Haram’s tactic advancement clearly demonstrates that Nigeria and its neighbouring Sahel region neighbours are ripe for exploitation as a cyber-warfare hub. If we use the impact of improvised explosive devices on Afghanistan and Iraq as an example, Nigeria and the Sahel can offer resources for “niggling” attacks
that target nation-states with “improvised explosive device” level attacks. These attacks would cause damage that is cumulatively significant, but individually not. The costs could remain low, as the readily available workforce functions in a region with an average annual income of $1180 (U.S. dollars). The nation-states employing this workforce will have a great cost-benefit ratio and the workforce itself will achieve success in their chosen field. This paper aims to examine the Sahel as an economic environment that is conducive to cyber-crime activities, an exploitable sophisticated cyber highway, and an area where officials are more focused on political distractors than enforcing information communication technology regulations.

**Session 3: 1:30pm-2:50pm**

**Round-table: Ethical and Methodological Issues when Clinicians and Researchers Lend their Skills to Studying and Attempting to Prevent Terrorism (Room CC1.01)**

**National Security and Behavioural Science: Opportunities and Challenges in Policy and Practice**

The behavioural sciences include a growing range of disciplines. This roundtable presentation will focus on some of the ethical and methodological issues that arise when clinicians and researchers lend their skills to studying and attempting to prevent terrorism. The work of the Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel on the Amerithrax case will be used as an example. These issues include the following:

- What roles can be played by clinicians and researchers in addressing terrorism?
- What professional, ethical, and political duties and influences are brought to bear in this work?
- What prevailing misconceptions exist among the general public, policy makers, and the intelligence community regarding the role of the behavioural sciences in addressing terrorism?
- When, and how, can research findings and emerging science be operationalized in a responsible fashion?
- How does the emergence of social media and electronic journalism affect the process of consultation and public perception of national security issues?
- Applying broad skills to a crisis: the Critical Incident Analysis process.

An emphasis will be placed on comparing how approaches to these issues differ between the US and UK, with the goal of engaging attendees from other countries to share their perspectives in an effort to derive some broad, shared principles.

**Participants:**

Lord Alderdice  FRC Psych (Moderator)

Gregory Saathoff, MD.

Ronald Schouten, MD.
The Individual and the Group in Terrorist Activity (Room CC1.18)

Paul Gill (University College London): Lone actor terrorist typologies

In the limited literature that currently exists on lone-actor terrorists, offenders tend to be depicted in a binary fashion; subjects either ‘are’ or ‘are not’ a lone-actor terrorist. Lone-actor terrorists are therefore typically treated in a homogeneous manner. Anecdotally, however, there are a number of easily distinguishable differences in lone-actor terrorist behavior and connectivity with other groups. For example, there is a noticeable difference between Ted Kaczynski and Timothy McVeigh in terms of prior memberships in contentious movements. Whereas Kaczynski had never been a member of activist groups, McVeigh had been a member of many. Noticeable differences are also apparent in Nidal Malik Hasan and Roshanara Choudhry’s interactions with Anwar al-Awlaki. Whereas Choudhry downloaded and consumed al-Awlaki’s sermons by herself, Hasan had been in direct email contact with al-Awlaki. There are also likely behavioral differences between different kinds of lone-actors in the developmental trajectory of their planned terrorist event. The descriptive analysis of our data (see Journal of Forensic Science, forthcoming) illustrates that there is no reliable profile of a lone-actor terrorist. Although heavily male oriented, women have also taken part in this form of terrorist behavior. Ages range from 15 to 69 at the time of arrest. Half were single, unattached and never married while the other half had been married, divorced or were in a significant relationship at the time of their arrest. Some had children while many did not. The educational attainment of our sample was evenly distributed across a broad spectrum. Many were unemployed, but many were students or in gainful employment. Some had criminal histories, military backgrounds or had mental health issues while others had no such experiences. Target types and attack methods also differed across the sample. In sum, the data illustrate a complex and diverse sample population. From such diversity, we seek to develop a classification system. The key is finding the optimal grounds upon which subgroups can theoretically make sense and are empirically verifiable while remaining operationally useful from law enforcement perspectives (Hood and Sparks, 1970). This paper describes ways in which we can conceive and categorize lone-actor terrorist typologies. Following a brief review of the literature on the development of typologies within criminological and forensic psychological contexts, we present preliminary descriptive and inferential results from our sample of 119 lone-actor terrorists.

Leena Malkki (University of Helsinki): Should School Shootings be Considered a Form of Lone Operator Terrorism?

School shootings and lone operator terrorism have been largely considered as separate phenomena. Still, they do have several things in common: both involve violence perpetrated by a single individual (or a very small group) and that the attacks have often been indiscriminate and have caused multiple casualties. Even if neither one of them is hardly a new phenomenon, both became identified as serious societal questions in the latter part of the 1990s. What seems to set school shootings apart from terrorism is the lack of political motivation. However, this view can be questioned. Many of the post-Columbine school shootings have been accompanied with communication including political and ideological statements and suggesting a political and instrumental purpose for the shooting: to inspire others to join the struggle. These political and ideological statements are often quite weak, but at the same time they hardly pale in comparison with the communication by some of those people who are commonly seen as lone operator terrorists. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the terrorism studies should pay more attention to school shootings – or whether the comparison of school shooting and lone operator cases rather suggests that there may be a need to rethink our views and definitions of lone operator terrorism.
Shane Drennan (University of St Andrews): Codifying and Analyzing the 'Leaderless Resistance': A Method of Analyzing the Threat of Leaderless Resistance Movements and their Ability to Succeed.

The concept of the ‘Leaderless Resistance’ has been a fascination of American radical right activists for decades, and has been more recently been applied to left wing and jihadi movements as well. Existing studies of leaderless resistances have focused solely on the destructive capabilities of burgeoning leaderless movements. To better understand the full threat of leaderless resistances a more comprehensive analysis of this strange organizational type is needed. In this essay I proffer a framework and method for analyzing leaderless resistances’ abilities to succeed at more than just destruction. Building upon methods used to analyze networks, I analyze three general characteristics common to most leaderless resistance movements and those characteristics’ effects on leaderless resistances’ ability to succeed. Moreover, I identify eight measurements of ‘success’ which are affected by these three characteristics of leaderless resistance movements. This method is designed to capitalize upon the empirical data resident in terrorism incident databases, mass media outlets, and social network site data coupled with an analysis of the social and political effects of each incident and its aftermath to determine leaderless resistance movements’ ability to ‘succeed’.

Timothy Holman (University of St Andrews): Se Battre la Loyale: French and Belgian ‘Foreign Fighters’ in Iraq 2003-2005

A limited number of scholars (Cerwyn & Moore 2008; Hegghammer 2010, 2011, 2013) have begun to examine and nuance the participation of Sunni Muslim extremists in political violence and terrorism. This form of violent activism has been termed ‘foreign fighters’; participation in conflicts to which the participants have no kinship ties, for which they receive no material benefits, and where engagement in combat is outside of a formal military structure. Research to date has examined this phenomenon at a macro-level (Malet 2007, 2009; Cilluffo, Cozzens & Ranstrop 2010; Hegghammer 2010, 2011) or as a country case study (Cerwyn and Moore 2008, Felter & Fishman, 2007, FPRI 2011). There has been little research at a network level similar to that conducted on terrorist networks (Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006; Mullins & Dolnik 2009; Clutterbuck & Warnes 2011). This paper examines Sunni Muslim ‘foreign fighters’ as a related, but distinct grouping, from Sunni extremist groups (jihadists) who plan domestic attacks. It focuses on two French and Belgian ‘foreign fighter’ networks active between 2003 and 2005. The paper compares two networks, one active in Paris, France (19th network) and the other active in Brussels, Belgium (Kari network) against research on domestic attack networks (Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006; Mullins & Dolnik 2009, Clutterbuck & Warnes 2011). Comparing these datasets with the two networks suggests that there is little to no socio-demographic difference between a ‘foreign fighter’ network and domestic attack network. If the composition of a ‘foreign fighter’ network is similar to a domestic attack network, in what way are these networks different? In the case of the two networks, the apparent objective was to send individuals into (ir)regular combat operations, as opposed to the planning and execution of a terrorist attack in their country of origin/residence. The majority of the members of both networks were involved only in ‘foreign fighter’ activity. The data – albeit limited – does not suggest a casual link or correlation between participation in ‘foreign fighter’ activity and participation in domestic terrorist activity. However, as the networks were disrupted and individuals on the edge of the network were unable to participate in ‘foreign fighter’ operations, examination of the French network indicates that a limited number of individuals may at a later stage involve themselves in terrorist activities via another network. If the goal of the ‘foreign fighter’ network is different, how is its success to be measured? The success of a network has, perhaps, two steps or measures; one) the number of foreign fighters sent into combat and two) the participation in combat operations by network members. Based on these measurements, both networks were successful as they put members into combat, had members return from combat and had members participate in suicide operations.
Joel Busher and Graham Macklin (University of Huddersfield): ‘Cumulative Extremism’: A Call for a More Detailed Analysis

The process of ‘cumulative extremism,’ whether known as ‘tit-for-tat radicalisation’, ‘echoes of extremism’, ‘reciprocal radicalisation’, ‘connectivity between extremisms’ or simply as an ‘escalating spiral of tension’, will be familiar to most researchers working in the field of terrorism and political violence. In recent years, the concept has been used effectively to call for greater attention to be paid to the interactions between opposing groups and ideologies – arguably a welcome adjustment to the overwhelming focus on Islamist terrorism in the immediate post-9/11 context. However, in spite of the growing popularity of this concept – particularly in policy circles – there has been surprisingly little attempt made either to define and describe these processes of ‘cumulative extremism’ and the mechanisms through which they operate in any significant detail, or to critically engage with possible limitations of this concept. This paper calls for just such a project, and sets out a series of issues that such a project ought to address. In particular, we argue that, to be properly understood, beyond a simplistic binary notion of two opposing political poles locked into a cycle of escalating antagonism, a more holistic range of factors and actors needs to be considered including the role played by public authorities and the mainstream media, whose actions can be equally important in shaping how political actors frame contentious issues and the repertoires of protest that they deploy.

Session 4: 4:15pm-5:50pm

Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Northern Ireland (Room CC1.01)

Mary Beth Altier (Pennsylvania State University): Does Violence Pay at the Polls: Evidence from Northern Ireland

Past work focuses on the electoral incentives elites have to incite or perpetrate violence in democracies, but few studies test how the electorate responds to such violence. Using original data for 78 district electoral areas in Northern Ireland, I examine the effects of conflict-related violence on Sinn Féin’s (the IRA’s political wing) vote share in local elections held during the Troubles. I find that the state’s killing of Catholic civilians and the IRA’s use of vigilante violence against alleged Catholic criminals were associated with an increase in support for Sinn Féin. Sectarian violence against Catholic civilians also had a positive effect on Sinn Féin’s vote share, but the effect was conditional on existing levels of support for the party in the local community. Qualitative evidence suggests that violence exerted an effect on Sinn Féin’s vote share when it influenced citizens’ perceptions of their security.

Danny Cox (University of East London): The Nexus Between Terrorism and Organised Crime: “the Irish Republican way”

Following the events of 11 September 2001, Governments, global law enforcement agencies and academics have increasingly examined the possible linkages between terrorist groups and organised crime in different parts of the world. This paper will look at the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Ireland. It will show that the profits from criminal activities are used to build the Balance sheet of Terrorist organisations and fund their activities, social unrest and various other criminal activities. By using the case study of the Provisional IRA it will be illustrated that a nexus between Terrorism and organised crime has existed for at least the last 30 years and the use of proceeds from crime, and the profits from both legitimate and illicit businesses have been used to finance terrorist related activities. By also looking at the case study of the current wave of dissident Irish Republican groups we are able to compare and contrast those activities of the past with the type of activities that continue today.
Neil Ferguson (Liverpool Hope University): Taking the Guns out of Politics: Disengagement from Northern Irish Paramilitary Groups

The paper will explore the processes involved when members of armed militant groups begin to re-evaluate their activities and the direction of their organisation and decide to remove themselves from the group or change roles within the group by moving from the violent militant faction or wing, into a non-violent support or perhaps political section. In exploring the disengagement process the talk will focus on the barriers and accelerators to disengagement, illustrated with quotes from interviews conducted with ex-combatants from the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Irish Republican Army (IRA). Until very recently (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Horgan 2009a) there has been a dearth of research exploring the processes and factors involved in disengagement from terrorist activities. This paper will explore the complex process of disengagement from militant extremism by incorporating an analysis of the interplay between micro, meso, macro and exo factors which are involved in either bringing about (a) individuals desisting from terrorism, or leading to (b) groups disengaging in military operations. The research is based on a series of one-to-one interviews with (ex) paramilitaries from Northern Ireland which were subjected to an IPA analysis. The paper discusses barriers and accelerators to disengagement and concludes that there are commonalities in the processes of both individual and group level disengagement which span different terror groups with varied structures and opposing motivations which means that lessons can be learnt by studying groups which have demobilized and entered the political mainstream.

Thomas Hennessey (Canterbury, Christ Church University): Defeating Terrorism: The Case of the Provisional IRA

The Northern Ireland Peace Process is held up as an example of a successful model in conflict resolution. Some of the lessons, as drawn from policy makers and participants in the negotiation of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, have been taken around the world. One of the key narratives in this has been the significance of talking to one’s enemies. But this paper argues that this narrative ignores fundamental historical factors that led to the British state’s strategic defeat of the Provisional IRA. The eventual agreement that the Sinn Fein-IRA leadership, of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, settled for, in 1998, was the product of British state coercion that gradually cut off the options for the Republican Movement. Academic debate on the Peace Process ignores both the use of state force as a method of strategic negotiation and the fact that the Provisional IRA was defeated. The paper argues that terrorism was defeated and draws on the historical record to demonstrate how this was done.

Rachel Monaghan (University of Ulster): Retro Counter-Terrorism: The Return of the Supergrass

In the 1980s nearly thirty members of paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland both republican and loyalist alike agreed to provide evidence against 500 of their former colleagues in return for a reduced sentence or immunity (complete or partial) from prosecution and a new identity and life. Such individuals although considered ‘converted terrorists’ by the authorities became more commonly known as ‘supergrasses’. Many of those defendants found guilty on the word of a supergrass had their convictions overturned on appeal. In addition, some 16 supergrasses retracted their evidence either before their trials had begun or were concluded resulting in charges against the accused being withdrawn. Thus, the supergrass trials of the 1980s with their high convictions rates based on the uncorroborated evidence of the ‘converted terrorist’ were largely discredited as a criminal justice mechanism in countering terrorism and political violence in Northern Ireland. Fast forward to September 2011 and the first supergrass trial in Northern Ireland for 26 years was held involving two members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Brothers, Robert and Ian Stewart provided evidence against 13 men accused of terrorist-related charges including murder, kidnapping and UVF membership. Like the supergrass trials of the 1980s, 12 of the accused were acquitted and the decision to allow accomplice evidence in relation to terrorism received much criticism. This paper will explore
the return of the supergrass in Northern Ireland and will examine whether or not such retro counter-terrorism is a useful tool in trying to reduce and eliminate terrorism.

**Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Nigeria (Room CC1.18)**

Ayorokveka Mark Amaliya (University of Erfurt): Boko Haram-From Genesis to Nemesis: A Securitization Analysis of Religious Discontent and Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria.

Circa a decade into its recognized existence, the Boko Haram sect has morphed from a locally based radical Islamic sect cum robbery gang to a jihad inspired Islamic insurgency group. With each stage marking a concomitant epoch in its repertoire of violent crimes, raison d’etre and modus operandi, the Boko Haram attacks have become the longest running serial thriller on the Nigerian crime scene. While the organization’s operational capacity has been characterised by great dynamism, the State’s ideological response has remained doggedly static, strategically routine and disproportionally lethal in terms of its dispense of force. The lack of a “mutual hurting stalemate” has pitted the State through its security agencies against the anonymous militants of the sect culminating in a typical protagonist-villain conflict cycle. Recording over 2,500 deaths to both collateral damage and militancy, it would be the absence of an incentive to militarily disengage that has sustained the violence in Nigeria as opposed to the inherent might of the actors in question. Prolonged and increasingly differentiated as the crises have persisted, critical scholarship into the constructive nuances of this national tragedy have in the most instances been policy oriented and historically rooted. In other accounts, public sentiments and politico-centric biases have encumbered a dispassionate and issue focused analysis of the menace. As its point of departure, this paper pursues a less trod path of analysing the phenomenon of domestic terrorism in Nigeria by adopting Securitization theory, postulated by the so-called Copenhagen school, arguing that Boko Haram’s current status namely as a terrorist or quasi-terrorist organization, draws significantly from the pattern of linguistic discourse at both levels of the state and public opinion, as well as the securitization of the sect’s radical dissent at the expense of a political scope of engagement. Through a thorough engagement of the securitization framework, this paper delineates the threat articulation process of Boko Haram’s activities by the state through military-centrism and its repercussions in defining the sect’s current agenda and weltanschauung. This will essentially cover the thematic levels of securitization analysis and their constituent units. By situating the state as the referent object, the government of Nigeria, acting in concert with its Senate as the principal audience and the plethora of both state and non-state media channels, providing the context to securitize the sect’s radical dissent culminating into what could be described as Boko Haram’s “exceptionalism” and “otherness” from the coterie of dissentful radical associations in the country. By establishing the threat perception nexus between Boko Haram and the state, this paper moves the discourse beyond the peripheral question of the nature and scale of the threat to the central question of the forces behind Boko Haram’s “exceptionalism” as a radical extremist group or rather the state’s antipathies to its employment of terror as a means to seek redress. Notable outcomes of the paper will be among others, the establishment of the fact that Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria is a construct of discourse and state securitization and not the inherence of the sect’s perpetuation of violence. Secondly, I argue that the securitization of radical extremism blinds the parties to an exit route of conflicts and creates an atmosphere of public indifference to the genuine plight and fundamental concerns of radical extremists groups. Finally, the paper seeks to reorient the framework for analysing the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria by considering the role of external actors in facilitating securitization at the domestic level as well as providing a mechanism to desecuritize the phenomenon by reverting to the political turf of addressing both national and economic issues.
Victor Ojakorotu (North-West University, Mafikeng): Taking Nigeria Hostage? Boko Haram Terrorist Acts and the Threat to the Unity of Nigeria

In recent times, given the trending of some new religious social movements in Nigeria, it has become extremely difficult to talk about Order as the State gradually witness the corrosion and erosion of the climate of amity in the social practices of religion as a particularly personalized interest. Distorting the hitherto prevailing amity means that there is, as it were, a case of overlap of interest – one in which religion now crosses path with politics, attempts to absorb and dictate for it, and in the process, unleashes terror. Perhaps it would seem that the current projections and actions of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is a direct confirmation of the confrontations of religion on politics resulting in the rendering of the polity as both a terror informed and restive social order. Could it be that the Boko Haram movement is speaking to a new found love for carnage, for violence and the relish of a throwback into barbarism in the 21st century? This paper examines the challenges presented by the presence, terrorist actions and operations of the Boko Haram movement to question the sensibilities of its provocations that seek to alter a pre-existing secular order long informed by the practices of toleration, accommodation and inter-religious dialogue that constitute part of an important toolkit for sustaining the longevity of the State. Furthermore, it contends that if the already prophesied end of the Nigerian state is not what is outlined and pursued in these provocations, then, there is need for a better understanding of the politics of dissent, and its adjoining limitations as core concerns of the democratic growth-plan that should include a policy of restraint on the part of ecumenical groups, properly so called.

Olawale Idowu (Osun State University, Osogbo): What Else is New?: A Comparative Analysis of the Maitatsine and Boko Haram Insurgencies in Nigeria

Using the development theory as a framework, this paper attempts a comparative analysis between the Boko Haram insurgency and the Maitatsine insurgency of the 1980s. Apart from being the most serious insurgencies in post-independence Nigeria, this paper argues that the Boko Haram insurgency shares the same origin, aims, membership, and modus operandi with the Maitatsine insurgency of the 1980s in Nigeria. This is because, they were both provoked by similar socio-economic and political forces. More remarkable is that there are discernible similarities in government counter-measures to suppress both insurgencies. Thus, relying on data derived from oral, archival, and secondary sources, this paper sets out to identify areas of fundamental similarities and differences in the Boko Haram and Maitatsine insurgencies, with a view to deepening popular understanding of the issues that are at the core of the Boko Haram insurgency in contemporary Nigeria.


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Nigerian state is not what is outlined and pursued in these provocations, then, there is need for a better understanding of the politics of dissent, and its adjoining limitations as core concerns of the democratic growth-plan that should include a policy of restraint on the part of ecumenical groups, properly so called.


Arguably, a predominant militarised counterterrorist approach is gradually losing appeal, both on the grounds of a failing long-standing stable security conditions and human rights violations such that “militarist rhetoric has lost credibility” (McSweeney 1999, p.5). In dealing with security situations conditioned by terrorism or insurgents’ activities, national as well as international governments and bodies must come to grip with the expanded notion of “security”. In its comprehensive and broad form, security encompasses sectors other than its traditional construct, military to involve political, economic, societal and environmental factors- a multi-dimensional approach to security (McSweeney 1999; Hanggi, 2004). The inadequacy and, to a degree, the ineffectiveness of militarised approaches has made the consideration of other means possible. One viable approach that has gained serious attention in recent times, particularly in the domain of Security Sector Reform (SSR), is development as a route to guaranteeing security. SSR is becoming relevant within the purview of development, security and democracy, and emphasises “the crucial role a well governed, efficient security sector plays in the provision of security and as a precondition of sustainable economic development. Conversely, if poorly managed and governed, the security sector can act as a spoiler of development efforts” (Hanggi, 2004, p.5) This paper seeks to compare the somewhat two most prominent insurgent groups (Boko Haram and Niger Delta) in the single most populous black nation in the world- Nigeria. The point of interest is however not in comparing the two groups, but in critically evaluating all the internal (government-federal, state and local, local NGOs), and external (foreign governments, external agencies such as EU, AFRICOM, ECOWAS, IMF, DFID and international NGOs such as Amnesty) responses since the beginning of the insurgency. Ultimately, the paper will argue that the dearth of development (economic, social and political) in Nigeria largely account for the state of insecurity and spate of insurgency. The paper will strongly argue that development can be both a cause and consequence of insecurity. In terms of the former, the lack and/or paucity of developments in these regions account for the increasing conflict situations, and in terms of the latter, development policies and aids from both internal and external sources, if wrongly appropriated, can aggravate, rather than alleviate conflict. This paper, using the Niger Delta and Boko Haram as case studies, therefore aims to study the crucial mix between human rights, development and security sector reform.
Day 2

Session 1: 9:00am-10:20am

Counter-Terrorism (Room CC1.01)

William Goodhind (University College London): How do you Break the Network? Targeting Hierarchical and Functional Structures in Non-State Actors

Academic and public policy thinking on non-state actor threats as a networked adversary, whether terrorist, criminal, or insurgent in nature, has become accepted wisdom in security discourse. It is recognised that the organisational structure of these non-state actors has morphed and evolved in response to technological advancements, the effects of globalisation, as well as the operational pressures put upon them by national and international efforts to tackle security threats. The result is the formation of organisations with an agile, reactive and decentralised structure, comprised of cells of interlinked, and often ideologically affiliated, groupings. In turn, the diffuse and dynamic character of contemporary terrorist and insurgent organisations has presented a doctrinal and operational challenge to state security apparatuses acting to counter these threats. The much debated question, therefore, is how do you defeat a ‘network’ enemy? One counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency tactic that has garnered much attention in the media and academia is that of kinetic targeting, with a particular emphasis on leadership targeting. Setting the contentious issue of legality to one side, this paper aims to discuss the effectiveness of kinetic targeting and the factors that can contribute to, or provide resilience against, network collapse. After briefly critiquing existing quantitatively-focussed literature on the topic, this paper will present what it describes as ‘hierarchical versus functional’ targeting, whereby the effectiveness of a targeting campaign is gauged on the type of target selected, set against the objectives of the targeting outcome. A distinction is made between targeting for tactical and operational effect, as opposed to targeting for strategic, political effect. The paper will conclude by highlighting the pitfalls of assumptions in hierarchical targeting, where seniority is often equated with the ‘value’ of an individual within a network and how this mind-set can influence expectations of success in defeating a network. As an alternative approach, it is proposed that an assessment of both the type of organisation being targeted and the limitations of a state’s targeting capabilities can provide a useful indicator of the likely effectiveness of kinetic targeting, whether for a strategic or operational outcome.

Carolin Goerzig (Virginia Commonwealth University): Strength versus Weakness – When to Negotiate with Terrorist Groups

Negotiating with terrorists remains a contested topic. However, several advances on the topic have been made in the literature to this date. While some authors focus on the question which terrorist groups can be included in negotiation processes and which cannot, some have investigated how to negotiate with terrorist groups. Since governments often do negotiate with terrorist groups it is pivotal to analyse how to successfully conduct negotiations. Governments frequently follow the strategy of weakening terrorist groups and prefer to negotiate with them when they are substantially weakened. However, a terrorist group might not be willing to negotiate in a moment of weakness due to the limitation in bargaining leverage. Both, strength and weakness can come to the detriment of attempts to resolve a conflict through peaceful negotiation. This paper will analyse the willingness as well as ability of terrorist groups to negotiate in moments of strength as well as in moments of weakness. Three parameters will thereby be investigated: strength versus weakness in resources, strength versus weakness in leadership and strength versus weakness in cohesion. The three defining elements of strength versus weakness will be analysed by means of three case comparisons: the wealthy Colombian Paramilitary versus the poor Indonesian Free Aceh movement, the leadership of ETA versus the leadership of the IRA and the fragmented Egyptian Jihad/ Al Qaeda versus the cohesive
Egyptian Jama’ah Islamyia. The results shed light on when to negotiate with terrorist groups – at strategic moments of strength or weakness in terms of resources, leadership and cohesion. Building on the findings strategies for negotiations can be designed and refined.

Hugo Rosemont (Kings College, London): Private Sector Engagement in the UK’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy: A New Agenda

Conceptual debates in terrorism research tend to understate the role that private companies play in countering terrorism, and rarely offer workable solutions around how the ‘terms of engagement’ between industry and the public sector could be improved in this field. This paper addresses this by considering the opportunity presented by the imminent appointment of a ‘Director for Security Industry Engagement’ within the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) at the UK Home Office. Although there are strong critics of any private sector involvement in counter-terrorism, both theoretically and practically, the paper argues that the OSCT’s plan to appoint a senior official with new responsibilities in this area demonstrates how the public-private interactions which feature as part of the UK’s ‘CONTEST’ strategy have become an increasingly important priority for Government. To stimulate a new debate on this subject, the paper proposes a programme of key issues and priorities which could serve as the basis of the new appointee’s strategy. In making the proposals, the paper illustrates how in the field of counter-terrorism the State is not solely dependent on companies which supply security services or products; Government departments and agencies now also interact with private operators and a wide range of other business entities and sectors at many levels. It is concluded that whatever function the new Director eventually fulfils, it will be essential that the private sector’s contributions to countering terrorism are bounded by strong principles and that they receive more effective oversight than at present.

Evan Jean Lawrence (Lancaster University): The Use of Peace NGOs as a Non-Traditional Counterterrorist Tactic

How has suicide terrorism evolved since the development of the tactic in the early 1980s? The goal of this paper is to evaluate the changing tactical and strategic nature of one of terrorism’s most deadly and shocking innovations. At the same time, this paper considers how media attention of suicide events has changed over the past several decades. We formulate a theory of how media coverage affects terrorist motivations for using suicide attacks, and we argue that the saturation of suicide events in the post-9/11 world has resulted in terrorists viewing the use of suicide bombings in a new way. Combining information on attack statistics and characteristics with new data on the media coverage of suicide events over time, we find that the targets and timing of suicide bombings has evolved in line with waning media attention. While traditionally a method to shock, coerce, and generate media coverage, we argue that suicide terrorism is now equally, if not more, valued for its tactical effectiveness and general lethality.

Ross Frenett (Institute for Strategic Dialogue): Unusual Stakeholders in the Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism

Counter-terrorism is usually viewed as something in which the state reigns supreme. Even when NGO’s are involved, such as in the PREVNT strategy, the state takes a leading role in funding and strategic direction. Does this have to be the case? What role do former extremists with a criminal record have? What role for survivors of extremist violence? What role for the tech sector and even the general public? This talk will ask these questions and outline the work of the Against Violent Extremism network which attempts to bring together these unusual stakeholders without the guiding hand of the state.
Round-table: Subcultures, Violent Radicalisation and Terrorism (Room CC1.18)

The round table aims to introduce and discuss a hitherto lesser explored perspective on violent radicalization and involvement in terrorism, namely subcultural approaches. The speakers will present novel conceptualizations and empirical findings relating to three forms of violent radicalization: Islamist, left-wing and right-wing, and in several European countries. The role of subcultures, subcultural socialization and products will be examined as they relate to individual and group radicalization pathways, up to involvement in terrorism. Additionally, the speakers will approach the interactions between subcultures, between subcultures and the mainstream and the way these insights might be applied in practical deradicalization work.

Gilbert Ramsay and Donald Holbrook (The University of St Andrews): Grading Scales and the Ontology of ‘Violent Radicalism’

There is now a substantial amount of scholarship addressing ‘violent radicalisation’ in the sense of work on how people come to engage in terrorism. There has also been a good deal of scholarly concern expressed about the ambiguity and potential abuse of the terms ‘violent radicalisation’ and ‘violent extremism’, despite their persistence in the language of policy. However, there remains a dearth of serious discussion about how ‘violent extremisms’ (for want of a better term) might, themselves, be conceptualized, as cultural phenomena without merely reducing them to aspects of violent (terrorist) activity. In this paper, we seek to problematize this issue within the empirical context of attempts by the law-enforcement community within the UK to develop and deploy grading protocols for identifying material on captured hard drives as appropriate to evidential requirements. By highlighting the ambiguities and incongruities which arise from the attempts of bureaucratic, legally constrained organizations to deal procedurally with a complex, fluid and irreducibly cultured set of phenomena, we show how these interactions help to reveal the ‘violent radical’ as a distinct object for inquiry, which is fully reducible neither to ideological ‘extremism’, nor to violent practice.

Daniela Pisoiu (University of Hamburg): The Porous Borders of Extremism

This presentation will outline the diffusion and learning effects among left-wing, right-wing and Islamist radical movements in Europe, and from the perspectives of narratives, subcultural imagery, style and repertoires of action. Approached will be learning and diffusion effects with respect to recruitment, propaganda and collective action mechanisms, particular symbols, clothing and music styles, and the constitutive elements of motivational narratives justifying engagement in violence and terrorism. Furthermore, it will outline overlaps with mainstream discourse and cultural products and will account for their role in legitimisation and motivational processes. The main sources of data are interviews with active and former radicals and archival records (subcultural products such as texts, photos, videos, graffiti, symbols, etc.).

Daniel Köhler (Freie Universität Berlin, EXIT Germany): Subcultures and Right-Wing Terrorism

This paper will talk about the role of subcultures in the radicalization phase of the NSU (National Socialist Underground) right-wing terror cell, in the context of the Thuringian right-wing scene of the 90s. After the German reunification, experienced West-German cadres (e.g. Michael Kühnen) came to the former GDR to take control of the right-wing scene already existent there. The early nineties had also constituted the high time of Skinhead groups in East-Germany, with violent riots in Rostock Lichtenhagen, Mölln, Solingen etc.; this crystallized in the perception of a political-revolutionary opportunity which the cadres molded into their strategic concept. Furthermore, new politicized subcultures developed out of the Skinhead scene, e.g. the National Resistance, Free Forces, Heimatschutz and later the Autonomous Nationalists. In short, on the basis of political transformations in Germany, a strategic influx of militant concepts from Western Germany, combined with an increasingly militant climate of subcultural political activism created a violent radicalization
environment that led to the most severe form of right-wing terrorism in post Second World War Germany.

Morten Hjørnholm (University of Aarhus, SSP adviser Sorø Municipality): Militant Subcultures of the Left-Wing in Scandinavia

The talk will focus on the anarchist, antifascist and single-issue militant subcultures of Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) and their development during the past 10 years. The analysis is based on a broad variety of data, from video material and websites to first hand observation of individuals and groups. Discussed will be the levels of militancy, the varying definitions and justifications of militancy and the mechanisms of radicalization within these groups. Additionally, subcultural identity markers such as clothing, lingo and demography and their role in radicalization processes will also be drawn from the data. Finally the talk will look into the current trends and tendencies pertaining to left-wing violence and terrorism throughout Europe since 2010 in terms of targets and modus operandi.

Session 2: 10:30am-11:50am

Terrorism and Islam (Room CC1.01)

John Strawson (University of East London): Uses and Misuses of Jihad in Counter-Terrorism Discourses

The use of the terms jihad and jihadi in connection to terrorism have become ubiquitous within counter-terrorism discourse, since September 11 2001. However, in Islamic jurisprudence the well-established doctrine of Jihad proscribes terrorism. It is seen as inconsistent with the use of force and the laws of war as developed in the international legal doctrines of Islam known as al-Siyah. Some contemporary Islamic scholars such as Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri go further and characterize those who use terrorism and outside Islam all together precisely because such acts are contrary to Jihad (see his “Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings” 2010). Al Azhar University indicating that its content has wide acceptance amongst Sunni jurists has endorsed this opinion. This paper will argue that the use of terms such a “jihadi-terrorism” within counter-terrorism discourses is unhelpful and undermines the use of Islamic jurisprudence as a potentially powerful tool against terrorism. However, the academic literature is replete with the use of the terms jihad and jihadi-terrorism, which have now entered the media and thus circulate amongst the international public as if scientific knowledge. This it will be argued causes confusion within the both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. The paper will argue that the correct understanding and use of the doctrine of Jihad has a significant role to play in isolating terrorist and combating terrorism generally. It will draw on classical and contemporary Islamic jurisprudence while reflecting on images of Jihad and Jihadi within academic and popular accounts of terrorism since September 11.

Cornelia C Beyer (University of Hull): The Political Motives Behind Islamist Fundamentalism

International terrorism has been in the focus of international research for a decade; however the attempts to explain its motivations have not yet come to a convincing conclusion. This paper argues that political, rather than religious, motives are at the root of international terrorism against the West. The paper analyses interviews with Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and presents an interpretation of the literature to argue that international terrorism is really ‘political violence’ with concrete political issues at its core.
Emmanuel Karagiannis (University of Macedonia at Thessaloniki): The Internationalization of Jihad in Afghanistan: The Strange Case of Western Fighters

The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan has attracted much interest from both the policymaking and academic communities. Contrary to the common perception, the Taliban movement is hardly a unified force. Indeed, the NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan have increasingly been targeted by insurgent groups which consist of foreign fighters. Very little is known about Western fighters who have joined the Taliban and al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The existing bibliography is very limited and does not answer important questions about these individuals. The scattered information that exists on Western jihadis indicates that they are mainly drawn from two nationality groups: Germans and Americans. Apparently, ethnic Germans and Turkish Germans have established their own group which is called the German Taliban Mujaheddin. The group is probably part of the Islamic Jihad Union (Jama’at al-Jihad – hereafter IJU) which was established in 2002 or 2003. The IJU has been held responsible for numerous attacks and plots in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Germany. Apart from participating in terrorist attacks, German jihadi fighters have been particularly active in propaganda dissemination through the use of new media. The German convert Eric Breininger was a famous member of that group; his memoirs, which were posted on jihadi websites after his death in Pakistan in April 2010, offered a detailed look into the world of Western jihadis. In Mein Weg nach Jannah [My Path to Paradise], Breininger explained how he was radicalized in Germany in the summer of 2007 and then moved to Afghanistan to fight alongside other jihadi fighters. Americans have not established their own separate jihadi group, but have played an increasingly visible role within al Qaeda. Adam Pearlman is the U.S.-born spokesman and media advisor for al Qaeda; Bryant Neal Vinas, a Hispanic American convert, participated in attacks against the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and helped planning an attack in New York’s Penn Station; John Phillip Walker Lindh, the so-called the American Taliban, fought alongside the Taliban prior and during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. This paper will attempt to explore the question of Western jihadi fighters in the Afghan-Pak region. First, it will describe their personal and social background based on the available information. Then, the paper will focus on the ideological orientation of the Western fighters and their switch from a localized to an international jihad. It will also discuss the role of Westerners in the jihadi movement in the region; more specifically, their participation in propaganda activities and logistical support, as well as their involvement in terrorist plots outside Central Asia. Finally, the paper will put forward several policy recommendations for Western governments and organizations in light of the upcoming departure of NATO and U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

Ahmet Tolga Turker (Istanbul Arel University): The New Global (Dis)Order and Social Movement’s Theory: The Case of Islamist Militant Movements.

The evolution of terrorism parallels the emergence of a new global disorder. The highly structured global order in which nation-states functioned as the sole major actors and terrorist organizations operated within the clearly defined borders of a single nation-state are long gone. In today’s global disorder, nation-states have no choice but to share their once simple and predictable global stage with relatively new actors. Transnational Islamist militant organizations such as Al-Qaeda are one of the most important examples of this new type of actor. Social movement scholars enjoy a strong theoretical foundation from which to address the debate about Islamist militant organizations and activism. Even though social movement theories have been developed in relation to other forms of activism such as civil society activism, anti-war movements and anti-globalization protests they have substantial insights to offer to the study of radical Islamist mobilization. Apart from this, the aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the existing social movement theory that is relevant to the study of Islamist militant activism in general and the role and impact of informal networks and alliances in the radicalization processes of such groups in particular. Accordingly, this project unfolds in four stages. First, it explores the dynamic interplay between the new international order and transnational terrorism with its radical Islamist variant. Second, while looking at a number of recent developments that paved the way for the replacement of the old system by a new order/disorder, it
discuss the links between the transformation of the global system and evolution of transnational Islamist militant organizations. Third, drawing upon political opportunity and framing factors that are integral to the understanding of any social movement, this paper illustrate that social movement theory is well equipped to provide explanations that aid in understanding the actions of transnational Islamist militant networks. Fourth, I consider the role and impact of informal networks and alliances on radicalization and recruitment processes of radical Islamist transnational terrorist organizations. Overall this paper argues that social movement scholarship, which originated mostly analysis of social movements in democratic settings offers valuable tools to understand militant Islamist movements in predominantly Muslim and non-democratic societies.

The Tactics of Terrorism (Room CC1.18)

Peter Eachus (University of Salford): CBRN Attack in the UK: Myth or Reality

The UK CBRN security strategy places great emphasis on countering a CBRN attack in the UK by a non-state actor or terrorist group. The threat posed by a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is perceived as very real and although the probability of such an attack may be low, the impact of such an attack remains very high. In this paper we will examine the factors that must come together in order for this threat to become a reality. It is suggested here that for a successful CBRN attack in the UK four primary factors are required, i.e. Intent, Access, Expertise, and a Covert Development Environment. Intent includes the ideology and belief system that would make a terrorist intend to carry out a CBRN attack. The terrorist group must have Access to the necessary resources, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear for their particular weapon of choice. CBRN weapons are not easy to construct and require specialist Expertise if they are to be effective. Finally, CBRN weapons are much more complex than simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and therefore the perpetrators must have access to secure covert premises in which to develop their weapon. This paper will look at the history of CBRN incidents, both accidental and deliberate, and will evaluate the technologies involved with a view to judging the likelihood of a future CBRN attack, in the UK, by a terrorist group, or indeed a “lone-wolf”, i.e. a single perpetrator. It is suggested that although the focus of this study is the UK, the findings are more widely applicable and should impact on CBRN security strategies, globally.

Raquel Duque (Catholic University of Portugal-Lisbon; ISCPSI): Terrorism in Civil Aviation: A Long-Standing Relation

Civil aviation has benefited significantly from the technological development that occurred throughout the 20th century. The decrease of the flight duration on the one hand, and the increase of the number of passengers on the other, facilitated the boost of air traffic worldwide. States and airline companies soon engaged in the creation of multiple international organizations which produced important normative frameworks aimed to guarantee an ordered and safe civil aviation sector. There is a wide range of threats to civil aviation which include all the actions that endanger the security of an aircraft, airport, air navigation facilities, crew, passengers and goods and people in land, but this paper will examine only the terrorist threat. The relation between terrorism and civil aviation is as old as the development of civil aviation itself and terrorist attacks against this sector are easily identified since the beginning of the 20th century, namely in South America, through the hijacking of pilots with the demand of ransoms or with the goal of making political propaganda. The typology of terrorist acts varied throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, oscillating between i) the detour of aircraft holding hostages by organized groups that demanded the release of fighters either in the exchange of the hostages, political concessions or even the payment of ransoms; and ii) putting bombs on the plane as hold baggage. In either case the media coverage played an important role in broadcasting the events to the common citizen amplifying the terrorists’ claims and purpose of generating a sense of fear. However, terrorism changed and the aircraft is no longer seen exclusively as the target but also the means of the attack, namely, the possibility to crash the
airplane against a certain target and turning it into a weapon of huge destruction. The attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) were paradigmatic and their magnitude placed civil aviation security in the top of the world political agenda. On the one hand, they contributed to the development of studies about the phenomenon of terrorism and its impact in the civil aviation security; on the other hand, they prompted political leaders to prioritize security issues and to reinforce international cooperation in the combat of terrorism in civil aviation. It is noteworthy the role of the United States, the European Union and some international institutions, specifically the International Civil Aviation Organization, European Civil Aviation Conference and International Air Transport Association. This paper aims to show in the first part the evolution of threats to civil aviation emphasizing the period after 9/11 and highlighting the role of the US as the driving-force not only to the production of crucial documents but also to the enhancement of existing institutions at the international level. In the second part this work demonstrates the progress achieved in the filed of legislative integration with particular focus to the European Union regulatory framework. The third part examines whether the harmonisation of legal and technical standards reveals itself a functional mechanism to deal with the current terrorist threats.

Felipe Pathé Duarte (Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Internal Security - Lisbon) and Pedro Xavier Mendonça (University of Lisbon): IED’s Strategic Capabilities: A Marketing of Dilution

In the last decade, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) became the watermark of global jihadi groups. Once under al-Qaeda’s umbrella structure, IEDs are a common insurgency tactic. It is a phenomenon that is spreading easily with global jihad ideology. Despite the manufacturing rudimentary technique, the IED’s concept is extremely sophisticated. The increasingly destructive capacity of the blast is a powerful communication tool used in Afghanistan, Iraq, Maghreb or Yemen. This paper aims to analyze the communication processes used by jihadis through the IEDs. The framework for the analysis will be the concept of “material semiotics”, often referred in Social Studies of Science and Technology, to point a communicational immanence that is present in the material obliteration by the blast. “Material Semiotics” concerns the pragmatic and performing trajectory imposed in the quotidian by corporeal as well as technological reality. The world of objects, tools, bodies, structures, and systems, set the ways of acting in society. The blasting of an IED causes of the this material reality, both corporeal (injuries and causalities) and technological (vehicles, buildings…). Thus, the trajectories prefigured in the existent materials, before the blasting, are obliterated (walking, driving, moving…). Nevertheless, this dynamic creates a certain sense that works as a marketing of violence. The destruction, of both material and corporeal reality, emerge as semiotics, i.e., as a lay of communication. This dilution creates a symbolic sense, differentiated from the material, causing a semiotic exchange between chaos and order, material, and communication.

Evan Perkoski (University of Pennsylvania): The New Suicide Terrorism

How has suicide terrorism evolved since the development of the tactic in the early 1980s? The goal of this paper is to evaluate the changing tactical and strategic nature of one of terrorism’s most deadly and shocking innovations. At the same time, this paper considers how media attention of suicide events has changed over the past several decades. We formulate a theory of how media coverage affects terrorist motivations for using suicide attacks, and we argue that the saturation of suicide events in the post-9/11 world has resulted in terrorists viewing the use of suicide bombings in a new way. Combining information on attack statistics and characteristics with new data on the media coverage of suicide events over time, we find that the targets and timing of suicide bombings has evolved in line with waning media attention. While traditionally a method to shock, coerce, and generate media coverage, we argue that suicide terrorism is now equally, if not more, valued for its tactical effectiveness and general lethality.
Shuki Cohen and Noha Osman (John Jay College of Criminal Justice): Empirical Assessment of Anti-Social and Pro-Social Sentiments in Palestinian Suicide Bombers' Last Wills

Despite considerable theoretical and professional efforts, suicide terrorism is still a poorly understood phenomenon, whose study is more speculative than evidence-based. Naturally, this holds particularly true on the individual level of the active suicide terrorist. However, in the case of Palestinian suicide terrorism, a confluence of religious, social, legal and political factors has created a widespread tradition of personal farewell letters, which also serve as last wills and testaments after the bomber’s death. The unique religious sanctity and political significance of these farewell letters drives both their reproduction on online fora and their ‘canonization’, whereby their editing or proofreading is not permissible. Thus, farewell letters written by Palestinian suicide bombers present a unique opportunity to understand the complex interplay of personal, social, ideological and religious considerations that culminate with the individuals’ commitment to engage in acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as the suicide bomber is aware of their will’s multiple social significance and function, they often apportion their letters to address multiple audiences, representing varying degrees of proximity and intimacy. Audiences range from their parents and close family members, to their comrades in the resistance movement, and to the people of Palestine in general. As such, psychological, sociological and criminological theories regarding the relative prominence of anti-social vs. pro-social sentiments as motives for terrorism can be directly and empirically assessed. This presentation is based on a study of 148 letters from the Corpus of Palestinian Suicide Bombers Farewell Letters (CoPSBFL). The corpus was collected through an extensive multi-pronged search of open sources, and contains letters that were written during the second Palestinian intifada (2000-2006). Consistent with socio-linguistic theories that posit a relationship between explicatory effort and the subjective importance of its aims, the number of words dedicated to each addressee in the last will was presumed to be proportional to the vested interest that the suicide bomber had in addressing and explicating their actions to that particular social circle in his or her life. To ensure the methodological reliability of this approach, the word count was conducted on the wills in their original Arabic. In general, the pattern of results is consistent with individual bombers being motivated largely by pro-social, rather than anti-social sentiments. Thus, across all wills, the proportion of words that addressed the bomber’s parents was similar to the proportion of words addressing other first degree relatives. Additionally, the proportion of words that addressed loved ones who are not first degree relatives was significantly lower than that which addressed first degree relatives, as expected. However, the highest proportion of words was reserved to the general Palestinian people and to the generic reader, suggesting a dual role for the wills as both personal and political meaning-making social platform. Consistent with this view, the proportion of words addressing the enemy -- mostly Zionists and Israelis, but also US political leaders -- were significantly lower than any other, more proximal, social category. The presentation will further dissect these results vis-à-vis the demographics of the suicide bomber, to better understand the complexity of anti-social actions in the name of pro-social sentiments.

Session 3: 2:00pm-3:20pm

The Psychology of Terrorism (Room CC1.01)

Janos Tomolya (NATO CoE-DAT, Ankara): Psychology of Terrorism

Terrorism is not a particularly new problem — it’s been a part of the world since civilization first organized. Despite how old it is, what we know about terrorist motivations and psychology is fairly limited. There isn’t a whole lot of empirical, scientific research on this topic (although there is an abundance of theory and anecdotal reports). As part of the ongoing effort to better understand the causes, motivations and determinants of terrorist behavior, based on a comprehensive review of the scientific and professional literature, my work analyzes key findings on the “psychology of terrorism.” In the current international security environment and operational framework, there is little question that terrorism is among the gravest of threats. Massive resources throughout the government
and private sectors have been allocated and re-allocated to the task of preventing terrorism. These efforts, however, often lack a conceptual - let alone empirically-based – foundation for understanding terrorists and their acts of violence. This void creates a serious challenge at many levels, from policy-level decisions about how a state should respond to terrorism, to individual-level decisions about whether a given person of interest, who espouses extremist ideas, truly poses a serious threat to U.S. personnel, assets, and interests. The purpose of my paper is to analyze and synthesize what has been reported from the scientific and professional literature about the “psychology of terrorism.” This focus is not intended to suggest that the scientific discipline of psychology provides the only, or even necessarily the best, analytic framework for understanding terrorism. Like all approaches to understanding or explaining human behavior, a psychological approach has advantages and limitations. Nevertheless, as psychology is regarded as “the science of human behavior,” it seems a reasonable, and potentially productive, line of inquiry. Although the basic question of how best to define terrorism has itself been a vexing problem, for purposes of this analysis, we are concerned generally with acts of violence (as opposed to threats or more general coercion) intentionally perpetrated on civilian non-combatants with the goal of furthering some ideological, religious or political objective. Our focus on psychological dimensions, de-emphasizes analysis of sociologically-based explanations (sometimes referred to as “root causes”) or macro-level economic and political theories. Moreover, our focus on terrorist acts de-emphasizes analysis of the psychological effects, consequences or amelioration of terrorism. In my paper I am going to answer to the following specific questions:

- How and why do people enter, stay in, and leave terrorist organizations?
- To what extent is psychopathology relevant for understanding or preventing terrorism?
- To what extent is individual personality relevant for understanding or preventing terrorism?
- To what extent are an individual’s life experiences relevant for understanding or preventing terrorism?
- What is the role of ideology in terrorist behavior?
- What distinguishes extremists who act violently from those who do not?
- What are the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups?
- How do terrorist organizations form, function, and fail?

After answering to the above mentioned questions I will give a short summary and reach some conclusions; there are three tentative conclusions are as follows:

(1) Terrorists focus their recruitment where sentiments about perceived deprivation are deepest and most pervasive; (2) Social networks and interpersonal relationships provide critical connections for recruitment into terrorist organizations; and (3) Effective terrorist recruiters either identify or impart upon the prospect a sense of urgency and imminence to “close the deal.” The group must be able to maintain both cohesion and loyalty. Effective leaders of terrorist organizations must be able to: maintain a collective belief system; establish and maintain organizational routines; control the flow of communication; manipulate incentives (and purposive goals) for followers; deflect conflict to external targets; and keep action going.

Milan Obaidi (European University Institute): The Implication of Person-Situation Dichotomy for Understanding the Psychology of Terrorism: Toward an Interactionist Approach.

Some argue that the controversy surrounding the person-situation debate within the field of psychology seems to have long been resolved. A plethora of research provides evidence demonstrating that both sides of the debate are right. Nevertheless, as a young psychologist and scholar investigating causes of homegrown terrorism, my experience attests to the fact that the dichotomy of person and situation is not fully resolved when it concerns the psychology of terrorism. Indeed, the person-situation dichotomy continues to strongly influence the way we understand terrorism and radicalization today. It seems that the scholars of terrorism, be it homegrown or suicide
terrorism, have often fallen prey to the temptation to polarize the field between the personal and situational determinants of radical behavior. Previous explanations have tended to emphasize individual explanations and have mostly relied on models of psychopathologies to explain terrorist behaviors. The current trend, on the other hand, is strongly influenced by the situationist perspective. Contrary to the previous trend, the current debate mainly emphasizes “normalcy”, and portrays terrorists as ordinary people no different than the rest of us. Violent behavior is seen as the product of social influence, also called “the power of the situation”. However, this approach perhaps clouds our understanding of terrorism; first, to a large extent, it disregards the personality variables in explaining terrorism, rendering the conceptualization of terrorism as a multifaceted phenomenon irrelevant; second, it fails to explain why some young Muslims participate in terrorism when others do not, even when they are exposed to the same social and behavioral settings. Because terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon, its causes, therefore, cannot be attributed to either situational factors or personality characteristics alone. This article argues that the dichotomy between personal and situational determinates of radical behaviors needs to be readdressed. First, a widespread adaptation of an interactionist approach for understanding terrorism is encouraged. Evidence from social psychological research is reviewed and presented to make a case for an approach that emphasizes the dynamic interplay between personal, situational and right societal factors. Further, the article argues that an interactionist approach - besides serving as a framework for research - will provide us with avenues to understand how relevant traits and situational factors interact causing some to radicalize; help researchers to better understand differences among radicals; and to identify why some young Muslim youth become radicalized, but not others; or why some might participate in terrorism in a certain context, whereas others will refrain from it. Second, this article argues that much valuable research with respect to terrorism already exists. An integrated interactionist approach would provide researchers with a way to untangle the puzzle of Islam related terrorism, and understand the complex interplay of causal factors already identified by research. Third, the article provides recommendations for future lines of research into terrorism.

Mary-Beth Altier and John Horgan (Pennsylvania State University): Into Terrorism, Out of Terrorism, and Back Again

Much attention has been paid in the literature to the reasons why individuals become involved in terrorist organizations and how they become involved. Less attention, however, has been given to understanding why and how individuals leave these organizations. Yet, the study of disengagement from terrorism holds important lessons for policymakers especially as they ponder the release of captured and imprisoned terrorists, such as those held at Guantanamo Bay, back into society. Are these individuals “rehabilitated” and likely to remain disengaged or will they to return to terrorism? What sort of initiatives can promote sustained disengagement and reduce the likelihood of recidivism for terrorist offenders? Drawing on a content analysis of English-language terrorist autobiographies and semi-structured interviews with former terrorists, this paper argues that the reasons why individuals leave terrorist organizations are not necessarily political or ideological in nature. Many individuals exit terrorist organizations for practical or opportunist reasons. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for foreign and domestic policy especially with regard to the development of terrorist “de-radicalization” programs.

Badrus Sholeh (Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University): Counterterrorism and Deradicalisation in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Indonesian Experience

This paper will analyse counterterrorism and deradicalisation programs in Indonesia with comparison of counterterrorism strategy in some Southeast Asian countries. According to Indonesian counterterrorism agency, more than seven hundred terrorists have been arrested since 2002 Bali bombings. Among the terrorists imprisoned are leaders of Jema’ah Islamiyah. However, the process of radicalisation is well continued by younger leaders through JI linked schools and organisations. I argue that Indonesian government fail to overcome terrorism and radicalism in Indonesia. The absence of comprehensive partnership between state and civil society is crucial factor in significant
growth of radicalisation in current Indonesian Muslims. Winning the support and confidence of the moderate Muslim mainstream will decrease the influence of islamism designed by radical jihadist groups (Barton, 2004: 85). Splinter cells of terrorist groups have been established in Central Java in 2011 through JI linked schools and loosely materials adopted in online sources provided by national and international blogging, websites and YouTube as well as printed books and journals written and managed by personals and groups affiliated to JI and other radical Jihadists. This paper in based on in-depth interviews with JI members from inside and outside prisons from 2010 to 2013 and critical analysis of written sources published by JI writers.


This presentation highlights work from an ongoing project that seeks to understand the activities people engage in upon joining terrorist movements. Though attempts to understand radicalization represents an understandable focus of terrorism studies to date, little effort to date has subsequently addressed what people do as terrorists. Nesser (2006) developed a typology of terrorism roles based on the July 7, 2005 London bombers, classifying al Qaeda members within the categories of “Entrepreneur,” “Protégé,” “Misfit,” and “Drifter,” but failed to ground these types in behaviors or across different attacks. While the distinction between different roles and their implications is important, a major weakness lies in the fact that these roles lack validity and reliability, as well as empirical verification. This project examines cases of convicted terrorists in the United States (drawing on members from such groups as al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, and al-Shabaab), and examines accounts of their involvement activities through the lens of Industrial/Organizational Psychology. In particular, this specialization of psychology frequently relies on the process of ‘job analysis’: a variety of methodologies and procedures used to analyze, document, and draw inferences about the requirements of a job such as work activities, worker attributes, and work context. Job analysis is also considered a method of identifying and determining job duties and requirements, as well as the relative importance of these for a given job. For this project, we use a hybrid approach— drawing on job analytic techniques that are both task-oriented and worker-oriented. Task-oriented methods focus on what a worker does to successfully perform a job, whereas worker-oriented methods focus on the attributes or characteristics a person needs to successfully perform a job. We apply the principles of job analysis to individuals convicted of terrorism in the United States who were affiliated with the global jihadist movement after September 11, 2001. Indictments were used to create a list of 83 specific tasks and activities, which are grouped into nine broader categories: emotional engagement, training, misuse or fraud of documents, concealment of activities/conspiracies, obtaining funding/support, attack planning, attack execution, providing support, and management. These represent a task-based approach, while the collection of offender demographics and background represent a worker-oriented approach.

Session 3: 2:00pm-3:20pm

The Importance in Context in Understanding Terrorism (Room CCl.18)

Kevin Fitzpatrick, Brent Smith and Paxton Roberts (University of Arkansas): Does Context Matter? Exploring the Role of Community in Understanding Terrorist Pre-Incident Activity in the United States, 1990-2010

The aim of this paper is to identify the characteristics of communities where persons indicted under terrorism related charges lived, planned, and prepared prior to carrying out terrorist attacks. Are there potential community level markers that can be identified that might help intervene before individuals radicalize or turn to violence? Little, if any, empirical work has been conducted on the locations of these activities leading up to attacks. Guided by a model of community deterioration, this
preliminary analysis looks to develop a “catalogue” of important community characteristics that both help distinguish between communities where terrorist activity occurred or did not, as well as documenting how these communities vary across geographic region and terrorist groups. Several important findings emerge: 1) Over three-fifths of residences and over one-half of pre-incident activities were located in counties different from the location of the subsequent terrorist incident; 2) Nearly half of all census tracts where perpetrators planned and prepared for their attacks were located in the western United States, while nearly one-fourth were the Northeast; 3) Nationally, pre-incident activity is more likely to occur in census tracts with a lower percentage of high school graduates, a lower percentage of owner occupied housing units, and a higher percentage of foreign-born persons; and 4) Census tracts with pre-incident activity are generally characterized by lower SES, poorer housing conditions, and socio-demographic characteristics that are significantly different than tracts without pre-incident activity. Equally important to note is that these overall patterns vary significantly by terrorist group type.

Amrat Haq (Hong Kong Baptist University): Terrorism is so “Passé”: An Analysis of How News Coverage of Violence is Desensitizing Viewers in Pakistan

Today for an audience of 9 million cable subscribers in Pakistan, there are approximately 81 local channels – of which 17 are 24-hr news channels. Therefore, there is a constant effort to fill the airtime and the easiest is through coverage of violent events (especially terrorism). Violent news content has become a permanent feature in Pakistan’s news cycle, with the audience constantly bombarded with violent images and stories. The country’s proximity to Afghanistan and its active participation in the War has led to a number of violent incidents in the country. A weakening economy, political unrest and sectarian strife have further added to these incidents. Consequently, people in Pakistan are regularly exposed to violence in its varied manifestations via the media, especially news media. With the continued presence of violence in news, there is a need to understand how this is affecting news viewers, especially their emotional reaction (or lack thereof) to this type of content and whether it is leading to desensitization in viewers. Desensitization includes changes in both emotional and cognitive responses. Emotional desensitization can be seen as the blunting or absence of emotional reactions to violent events, which would normally produce a strong response, whereas cognitive changes can be seen through acceptance of violence as the rule; instead of the exception. Therefore, observing the media’s behavior and keeping media effects research on exposure to violence in mind, the researcher was interested in seeing whether regular exposure to violence news and violent acts led to desensitization of the audience. A cross-sectional study of 1000 news viewers from across Pakistan was conducted. Preliminary analysis indicates that there exists a positive correlation between news viewing and desensitization of viewers. A detailed analysis is underway.

John Preston, Charlotte Chadderton and Kaori Kitagawa (University of East London): What’s so Exceptional about Education in the ‘State of Exception’? A Comparative Analysis

The term ‘state of exception’ has been used by Agamben to explain the ways in which emergencies, crisis and disasters are used by governments to suspend legal processes. This concept has had some limited application in educational studies. For example, in explaining how schools adopt ‘exceptional’ policies in terms of surveillance for suspected extremism or terrorism and as vehicles for national/civil defence. However, whilst the ‘state of exception’ is a useful descriptive concept to explain processes of state sovereignty it presents a limited theory of social justice when applied to education systems. Additionally, despite Agamben’s attempts to situate the state of exception comparatively, applications of the concept often do not take into account historical and national differences in ‘states of exception’ particularly in terms of distinctive European, Asian and Oceanic conceptions and practices of rights, emergencies and state powers. In this paper we consider the extent to which the concept of the ‘state of exception’ can adequately account for differences in the ways in which education systems are utilised by states in five countries (UK, US, Japan, New Zealand and Germany) in situations of disaster, terrorism, emergency and crisis. This research is based on archival and interview data obtained from an ESRC funded project “Critical infrastructure collapse
and mass population response: a comparative approach”. We examine the historical development of ‘states of exception’ with relation to CNI (Critical National Infrastructure) protection and related moves in education systems examining differences as well as similarities between nation state regimes from the end of the Second World War to the present day. We consider that the contemporary emphasis in the UK and US on the suspension of rights and ‘emergency powers’ is itself geographically and historically ‘exceptional’. ‘States of exception’ pre-9/11, particularly outside of the UK and US, are characterised by different articulations with education systems. We conclude by addressing the limitations of the ‘state of exception’ for an analysis of social justice in education. Firstly, we consider the normative nature of the state of exception using both Critical Race Theory and Marxist critiques. Secondly, we consider that theories of the ‘state of exception’ adopt a particularly Anglophone conception of rights and emergencies and that there are important differences in other national contexts. We conclude by arguing for an expanded, and contextualised, conception of social justice and inclusion in education with regard to applications of the ‘state of exception’.

Imran Awan (Birmingham City University) and Sara Correia (University of South Wales): Engaging with the Muslim Community in Cardiff: A Qualitative (Pilot) Study of the Impact of Counter-Terrorism Legislation

Since 9/11 there have been over 1,500 terror suspects arrested in the UK with nearly two thirds released without charge. This has led to claims from within these communities that the police tactics are both heavy handed and counter-productive. This study presents findings from a (pilot) research project (2012-2013) that examined how best to engage with the Muslim community and to examine the perception of Muslim communities with regards to counter-terrorism. There were two aims for the pilot study. The first was to provide members of the Muslim community in Cardiff with information about the nature of the study, its objectives and the individuals who would be undertaking the research. The second, following from the first, was to assess the feasibility of different methods of undertaking the research with representatives of the Muslim community in Cardiff. This in turn would help address issues such as how to gain access to various sections of the community, gaining informed consent for participation in the research, appropriate methods of data collection, appropriate venues for the fieldwork, identification of ethical concerns arising from the research, any risks that might arise, and the strategies needed to overcome these risks.

Timothy Wittig: The Financing of Terrorist Regimes

Counter terrorist financing (CTF) has emerged as a boutique counterterrorism art, but one based on shaky intellectual and ethical foundations. The identification and exploitation of adversary supply lines, economic and financial relationships, and access to resources is a powerful means to both understand terrorist networks and attack them. However, as practiced, CTF has often proven ad hoc, illogical, and unethical to the point of being anti-democratic. Starting from the premise that the many of shortcomings in CTF stem from the lack of a coherent framework for collecting, analyzing, and utilizing terrorist network financial information, this paper presents a model for ‘targeted financial intelligence’, which, it is argued, offers the intellectual foundation for CTF efforts that are sounder analytically, more effective in practice, and better aligned with core liberal democratic principles.
Session 4: 3:30pm-4:50pm

Women and Children in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (Room CC1.01)

Mia Bloom (Pennsylvania State University): Charting the Increasing Role of Children in Violent Extremist Organizations

Recent human rights reports have linked armed groups like Ansar Dine, Boko Haram, al Tawhid wal Jihad in West Africa, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) with “forcible recruitment of hundreds of children who are being used as combatants and sex slaves and, in some instances, killed.”[1]. These facts coupled with the release of the 2012 Human Security Report [http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2012/text.aspx], raises the issue of how to combat the scourge of child soldiers and combatants. While reservations have been expressed over the quality of the data on child soldiers and the extent to which statistics might reflect the funding priorities of humanitarian agencies, the truth remains that the average age for terrorists is getting younger[2] and the problems facing militarized children are spreading. In seeking to explain the increasing extent of children's involvement in terrorism, it is necessary to illustrate the changing role of children from victims to perpetrators and demonstrate the disturbing interchangeability of these roles. Many children are coerced into participation and are groomed to victimize others as part of their apprenticeship into a violent extremist organization. We need better ways to prevent child recruitment into terrorist and other extremist movements, how groups lure children and what role parents, teachers and the community play in preventing or facilitating children's involvement. This paper is based on data recently collected in Pakistan and demonstrates the increasing role of children in violent extremist organizations.

Connie Dunscombe and Kelly Wade-Johnson (The University of Queensland): Women and Suicide Terrorism: Gendered Representations of Female Agency in Violence

Suicide terrorism is considered to be an increasingly prevalent form violence used to achieve political goals. In the wake of the ‘Global War on Terror’, some scholars have suggested that the cause of this form of terrorism stems from the apparent parallel rise in Islamic fundamentalism since the end of the Cold War. While this position has been solidly critiqued by scholars such as Robert Pape, Mia Bloom and Scott Atran, what remains to be fully explored is the role that gender plays in suicide terrorism. There are competing narratives regarding the representation of women as terrorists within the current terrorism studies literature and from the terrorists themselves. Representations of women suicide terrorists are continually framed in terms of a gendered discourse that posits the masculine as Self and the feminine as Other; through representations of female suicide terrorists as the ‘real “men of steel”’ (Waduge 2008), the ‘Black Widows’ (Hall 2012), as ‘sexy, tough or inept’ (Sternadori 2007). As a result, this provides a space for greater understanding in terms of the denial of the agency of women to be involved in this form of violence in their own right. Our paper challenges these representations of women; we argue that the role of women in suicide terrorism is far more complex. This speaks to the underlying narrative of power that both informs the role of gender in terrorism studies in general, and speaks to representations of the ‘Muslim woman’ and ‘Muslim woman suicide terrorist’ in particular. Using the case studies of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, this paper will delve into that space by examining how women are represented by the terrorist groups themselves, and compare these narratives to the dominant assumptions regarding female participation in suicide terrorism.
Women have been actively involved in secular terrorist groups worldwide for decades. Given the rather limited role ascribed to women by Islamist ideology, it does not seem surprising that we have not seen any women being directly involved in combat activities carried out by Islamist terrorist groups until recently. After nationalist-Islamist terrorist groups had started to make use of women in their operations, global jihadism seemed to be the last bastion of men-only jihad until patterns of female involvement among Chechen and Iraqi terrorist groups started to emerge. Since then, women have been actively involved in global jihadi terrorism in Iraq, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Morocco, Somalia, Egypt, Jordan, India, Pakistan and Kashmir. However, it has only evolved as a pattern among Chechen and Iraqi global jihadis. Why is that? Under what circumstances does female participation in global jihadi terrorism become a repeated pattern? If the involvement of women in terrorism is rising, only a limited number of (mainly descriptive) studies on this issue have been published. If there is no doubt that these first studies are of value, more comparative studies are needed so that we can explain not only how but also why women become actively involved in terrorist activities. Many (of the few) studies of women in terrorism focus on one or several single cases without systematically contrasting them. Often, the focus is on individual motivations and not on organisational motivation – leaving out an essential aspect of active female involvement in terrorist activities. In the scarce literature on the topic, two possible explanations for organisational motivations for female participation are being put forward, one of them of tactical (terrorist groups adapt to pressure caused by aggravated conflict situation; women are being employed if the escalated conflict requires it) and the other of socio-cultural nature (terrorist groups benefit from low levels of cultural conservatism within a society that does not categorically oppose women on the frontline; women are being employed if a [relatively] gender-inclusive, open society allows it). This small-n comparative study of global jihadi groups operating in Chechnya / Russia, Iraq and Afghanistan shows that it is not social and cultural structures that are decisive in whether a given group opts for the inclusion of female operatives but tactics. Despite their religiously oriented ideology, global jihadi terrorist groups are rational actors. If the forces countering the terrorists are successful enough to cause extreme stress to the groups (by restricting the mobility of their male operatives, limiting the group's male manpower or leaving them in need of increased attention to their cause), these groups are likely to resort to female combatants - regardless of prevailing socio-cultural norms and structures. Tactics trump culture.

Traditionally, counter terrorism policing has involved undercover work, intelligence gathering and a close working relationship with the intelligence services (Hewitt 2008). It has been an inherently ‘crime fighting’ orientated area of police work with dedicated units (Special Branch, SO13 & SO15 to name just three) which require a high level of specialisation from officers. Often these specialist officers and units have previously worked in a covert, secretive way which is removed from the daily policing experienced by Neighbourhood Policing Teams (Hayman & Gilmore 2009; Keeble & Hollington 2010; Bahadur Lamb 2012). As such, counter terrorism fits with Westmarland’s (2001) ‘gendered police work’ thesis, which argues that different elements of police work become gendered, based on cultural beliefs about what sort of work should be undertaken by each of the sexes. Thus, according to Westmarland (2001) the action orientated, specialist areas of policing become associated with men due to the potential exposure to danger and the need to use force. In contrast, those areas of police work which are perceived as requiring a softer, more holistic approach become gendered female due to their reliance upon listening, comforting and sensitivity. Westmarland (2001: 75) evidences officers explicitly listing neighbourhood policing, victim support and child protection as police roles inherently suited to women. Due to such perceptions Westmarland found that women within the police force are often assigned to roles which resonate with their gender. Thus, it is unsurprising that Westmarland (2001) found that women do make up a larger proportion of the
officers in the roles mentioned above. This gendering of police roles and the subsequent assignment of officers to roles based on their fit with the perceived gender of the work is relevant to PREVENT due to its emphasis on community engagement and social cohesion building. This paper explores the ways in which PREVENT policing and its required skill set of sensitivity; listening and engagement may be changing the ways in which the gender attributed to counter terrorism is conceptualised. By utilising findings from a recent case study it argues that PREVENT has changed the conception of the gender of counter terrorism work away from being associated with traditional understandings of masculinity and moved it towards a softer, potentially, more feminine conception.

Simeon Alozieuwa (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja): Boko Haram: In Search of the Female Mujahedin –the ‘Mujaidaat’

Since its formation and up to 2009 when it first clashed with state authorities, thus etching itself onto public consciousness till now, the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, which has waged a campaign of terror in parts of the north of the country has remained a male-dominated organization. Although it boasts of female membership, unlike Salafist Muslim revivalist social movements elsewhere, there is no evidence suggesting that the Boko Haram’s female members have played any significant role in the sect’s actual violence. Its female members have remained at the marginal levels in its entire campaign serving as wives to the men and hiding their weapons for them. They have not transcended beyond the traditional role of female terrorist- giving birth to revolutionary fighters, raising the children in a revolutionary environment thus facilitating their recruitment into organizations, and to praising them after their death. The paper explores this tendency and argues that the non-inclusion of female members in its violence is a function of two factors, namely, the social milieu in which the violence is taking place and the personality of the leadership. The paper further contends that the Boko Haram terrorism has however shown remarkable changing patterns, over time exhibiting tendencies which were not originally found in the group’s violence. For instance, the sect initially directed its rage against the police for allegedly killing its leader Mohammed Yussuf. Other security forces later however came within the orbit of its rage as the state intensified its crack down on the sect. It initially also targeted only non-Muslims but has since included Muslims and Moslem targets in its violence, apart from attacking non-security formations and building. Amidst sustained crack down, by the state, which has led to the curtailing of its violence, and depletion of its membership, therefore, Boko Haram will become desperate and may begin to involve its female member in actual violence. There is, therefore, the need for the state to take proactive measures to ensure that the sect does not exploit the cultural tendency that perceives the female folk as less likely to engage in terror activities, and therefore not much of security attention and vigilance.
National Case Studies (Room CC1.18)

Emma Leonard (Pennsylvania State University): Violent Choices in Civil War: Explaining the use of Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, and Sexual Violence by the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone

Civil wars is a growing area of research within Political Science and, while much has been written about the causes of war and increasingly the consequences of war, little had been written about the dynamics of the conflict itself. Yet the dynamics of a conflict will influence the consequences of the conflict and the process of post-war reconstruction. One of the most important dynamics within a conflict is that of violence. We can hypothesize that different forms of violence will have differing impacts on the post-war environment – it would seem logical to expect that terroristic violence in civil wars would produce a different post-war environment than a conflict where guerrilla or sexual violence has been the predominant strategy – but there is as yet little research in Political Science that examines this. When is guerrilla warfare the more rational choice for rebels in civil wars and when is terrorism? Why are some civil wars accompanied by widespread sexual violence when others are not? Recent literature within the study of civil wars (Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 2006) has sought to explain under what circumstances discriminate versus indiscriminate violence occurs in civil wars. But discriminate and indiscriminate violence can take on different forms, which will have different consequences both during the conflict and on the post-conflict environment. Each form of violence discussed here is now the subject of a vast and often growing literature that seeks to explain why the use of that form of violence is rational, but the use of these forms of violence is rarely discussed in any comparative sense. This project seeks to fill this gap. Using an original dataset of village level violent events in Sierra Leone, this project tests a series of hypotheses from the guerrilla warfare, terrorism and sexual violence literatures, in a comparative perspective. Specifically, this project will demonstrate the circumstances under which the RUF was more likely to use guerrilla warfare and the circumstances under which the RUF was more likely to use terrorism and/or sexual violence against the civilian population.

Rina Kirkova (Ss Cyril and Methodius University) and Nenad Taneski (Military Academy – Skopje): Macedonia Case Study: The Oasis of Peace on the Way to Islamist Paradise

This paper argues the possibility of occurrence of ‘lone actor terrorism’ in Macedonia. In the time of dissolution of Yugoslavia, when the Islamist ideology imported from Arab countries rapid spread throughout the Balkans the peaceful Macedonia gained the label of ‘oasis of peace’. But this epithet was lost with the inter-ethnic conflict of 2001. Since then the inter-ethnic relations are fragile and inter-religions differences are stronger. The culmination reached with the fivefold murder from 12 April 2012, on the eve of the biggest Christian holiday – Easter. While the bigger part of the expert and academic public assessed this act as an act of terrorism motivated by the radical Islamist ideology, the opponents qualified the killings as an act of crime. However, the inter-ethnic incidents provoked by the political rhetoric in the country, only strengthen the feeling of national and religious differences that exist in the divided society and represent serious factor for inciting terrorist activities. In this paper we will identify the threat genesis and then, through the analysis of the conditions we will establish the factors that have impact on the deterioration of the inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions, as reason for strengthening the radical Islamism and the occurrence of the ‘lone actor terrorism’.
Humberto Librado (La Gran Colombia University): Bibliometric Analysis for Scholar’s Production About Security and Conflict Issues in Colombia

This study aims at analyzing the research output performance of political scientists about the security and conflict issues in the most representative scholar journals in Colombia between 2009 and 2012, besides compares this behavior with the characteristics of three of the most cited journals in political sciences according to ScienceWatch.com ranking from Thomson Reuters by this period. The analysis cover mainly the number of articles, authorship pattern, subject wise distribution of articles, average number of references per articles, and the networks created by these references. In this way, the study pays especial attention in the relations established between national and foreign authors to construct the explanations about the internal conflict. Thus, it evaluates the impact of the current theoretical and methodological disputes in political science about security and conflict theory in the Colombian scholars production.

Ana Varela-Rey, Alvaro Rodríguez-Carballeira, Jordi Escartín, Javier Martín-Peña, O. Saldaña, Clara Porrúa-García (University of Barcelona): Breaking the Silence in the Basque Country: First Step in a Reconciliation Process

ETA (Euskadi Ta Askasuna) announcement on 20 October, 2011, “the definitive cessation of armed activity” finishing with more than 50 years of terrorism in the Basque Country and Spain. ETA was the last European terrorist organization in operation. During the past years, the public opinion with regard to ETA’s violence has undergone important changes. Components such as the consolidation of democracy in Spain, the increasing indiscriminate attacks by ETA or the increase and strengthening of peace movements in the Basque Country have contributed to the loss of social support to the use of violence by ETA. In spite of the fact that in reconciliation processes the opinion expression is a key factor to change social integration norms by modifying the social values and believes that operated in the conflict, previous research from the sociology discipline has shown that, although ETA’s violence has lost social support, there has not been an increase in the talks about the events of the past. Hence, the objective of this study is to analyse how Basque youth deals with the topic of the violence in the Basque Country in their interpersonal relationships. Specifically, we focus on the components that facilitate or inhibit the expression of opinions. A Likert survey has been conducted on a sample of 250 graduate students whose residence is in the Basque Country. The survey includes variables from the Spiral of Silence Theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), others focusing on attitude strengths, and demographic variables for control. Preliminary results show that Basque youth is reluctant to speak about the violence suffered in the Basque Country independently of the context. Between 40 to 60% of the sample never or seldom speaks about violence in the Basque Country. However, if we establish a hierarchy of the social context, the results show that they are more willing to speak about violence with their inner circle, namely family or friends, than with their outer circle. But they are more reluctant to speak about violence with their neighbours than with strangers. A regression analysis showed that attitudinal variables and the fear of isolation contribute to explain the silence in Basque society, while demographic variables and perceived public opinion do not impact on the willingness to speak.

R.P. Pradhan (BITS Pilani KK Birla Goa Campus): Terror Management and Political Economy of India’s Red Corridor

India’s terror fault lines can be zeroed into three prominent locations. India recorded around 53,000 terror casualty in 1990s. Jammu & Kashmir, India’s most known terror flash point shared 35.35% intensity and casualty; North Eastern Provinces of India having experienced intra tribal, ethnic insurgency for over three decades shared 34.02% of casualty; and third, the home grown Left Wing Extremism (CPI Maoists), striking India’s vulnerable underbelly in 165 districts spreading over nine States (provinces) of India and shared the third highest casualty of 20.72%. Given their strong left wing armed aggression methodology, Maoist infested areas are official Red Corridor of India and Maoism is recognized as the most serious internal security threat to India’s strategic space and around
65,000 armed troops needed to combat them tactically. As per article 4 of the CPI Maoists Party, their immediate goal is to accomplish the New Democratic Revolution in India by overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism; distant goal is to establish the people’s democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat for the establishment of socialism. Their method to accomplish the goal is through “Armed Agrarian Protracted People’s War”, the “Area wise seizure of Power” and “Encircling the cities from the country side”. While they are ideologically and methodology guided by Mao Tse-tung, they also borrow Che Guvera’s Urban Struggle Perspective and guerilla warfare strategy to achieve their objective in India. The Red Corridor is India’s richest mineral resource zone with poorest socio-economic and wellness indices. Long seated marginalization and alienation being the biggest rallying point for the Maoists, some degree of local support and intellectual agreement of the movement is inevitable. Since large tribal population and deep forest terrain define the geographic contours of the region symbolizing near absence of government and its apparatus, the Maoists seem to have visible advantage in the first phase of their stated objective. Now the urban industrial violence in India is beginning to witness traces of Maoist involvement which could well indicate a possible set stage for their urban struggle. As an organization, the Maoists are officially quantified to be around Rs.20billion (Rs.2000cr) worth which is much more than the education budget of most of the affected states. It is one third of India’s internal security expenditure and more than India’s internal security modernization plan outlay. By 2020, India is expected to spend around $32.6billion on internal security. The cost of left wing terror management therefore shall be heavy on India which will shrink development expenditures drastically. Primary motivation for this paper therefore is to analyze India’s Red Corridor & Political Economy of Terror Management. The paper shall dwell on Red corridor’s long range threat assessment, terror funding mechanism and Govt. of India’s response to threat as well as dilemma of internal security management.